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The increasing drive of all nations to achieve political
and economic independence is acutely felt in Asia. As the
Asian nations attempt to grow, major powers offer various
types of assistance, with or without conditions attached.
It is increasingly important to comprehend the implications
of any treaty that becomes effective for an Asian nation.
The Soviet Union utilizes the Treaty of Friendship, Co-
operation and Mutual Assistance to legitimize and legalize
aspects of its foreign policy: military material and per-
sonnel assistance; counter the major power influence;
increase Soviet security; political and economic actions.
This thesis examines the Treaty of Friendship, Co-
operation and Mutual Assistance and its application in Asia.
It examines four Asian signatories of this type of Soviet
treaty: Afghanistan, India, Mongolia, Vietnam. The exami-
nation attempts to identify those areas of Soviet Asian
foreign policy that have been aided by the Treaty of
Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a study of four Treaties of Friendship,
Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance that have been concluded
in Asia between the Soviet Union and: Mongolia (1966)
,
India (1971), Afghanistan (1978), Vietnam (1978). The
treaty with Mongolia, like the earlier treaty with North
Korea, is essentially a mutual defense arrangement; and to
that extent is substantially more limited than the broader
and more recent treaties with Afghanistan, India or Vietnam.
The treaty between the USSR and Afghanistan may be looked
upon as a model in that it illustrates most graphically the
techniques used and the ends pursued by the Soviet Union in
linking itself with its Asian allies.
This thesis has proceeded from the assumption that the
Soviet Union has utilized the machinery or negotiation as
well as military build-up in protecting its interests in
Asia. Each single treaty herein discussed may or may not be
a part of an ultimate Soviet vision of a system of collective
defense in Asia. The treaties show that in each instance
the Soviets have achieved a definite measure of success and
each successive negotiation may be interpreted as a part of
a carefully thought out diplomatic offensive.
Furthermore, it is my hypothesis that the text of a
treaty may reveal to a large extent the nature of alignment
9

which might subsequently be anticipated between the USSR and
the individual state concerned. It is reasonable to postu-
late that future relationships between the USSR and other
nations in Asia may follow the model under study. To this
extent, the present thesis may contribute a possible basis
for predictability of future Soviet aggressive moves towards
other Asian nations, utilizing this type of treaty.
By way of conclusion, this thesis suggests that the
Soviets are actively pursuing their own concept of a collec-
tive security system for Asia; that they are seeking a
favorable Asian balance of power; and that they are building
the strongest possible position with potential allies who
occupy strategic geographic positions. It is beyond argu-
ment that the Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual
Assistance performs a useful role in the pursuit of the
Soviet Union's national political and security objectives.
10

I. BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
Since the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union
has used the Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation , and Mutual
Assistance* commonly referred to as a Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation, to identify those national governments with
close, friendly relations with the USSR and as a tool of
Soviet foreign policy. This type of treaty is not intended
to be a treaty of peace but a tool of Soviet diplomacy spe-
cifically designed to protect and promote the national
interests of the Soviet Union.
It has provided the means to legitimize and legalize
aspects of the Soviet Union's foreign policy in Asia, in-
cluding military material and personnel transfers, counter-
ing the influence of other major powers, increase its own
security, as well as political and economic moves. The
Asian TOFCMA's have increasingly become a tool which both
the Soviet Union and the other signatories utilize to gain
advantage, either materially of psychologically.
The effect of the TOFCMA's on Soviet Asian foreign
policy, and on the Asian countries, is very important. The
treaty is an important aspect of Soviet international law.
The increasing drive of Third World nations to achieve
*Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance
will hereafter be called TOFCMA.
11

political and economic independence is acutely felt in Asia,
where major powers offer various types of assistance, with
or without conditions attached. The implications of a TOFCMA,
both for the Soviet Union and the other signatory requires
full comprehension.
A. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
International treaties and agreements are important
aspects of relations between states. They can be instruments
of stability as well as catalysts and moderators of inter-
national relations. Treaties can normalize and order
relations among states and can be adapted to general as well
as specific situations.
By utilizing treaties, the Soviet Union can clarify and
cement its relations with other states at various stages of
their development. Treaties have aided the Soviet Union in
its own development, whether by fulfillment of treaty obli-
gations or by violating their obligations. Treaties have
proven to be a vehicle for Soviet tactical and strategic
objectives since the founding of the Soviet state.
The development of a Soviet concept of international
law began with the establishment of the USSR. Initial
studies in this field were led by N. N. Golubev, dealing
with basic theory but not applying it to the Marxist model
of government. The first scholar to apply international law
to the Soviet form of government in existence at his time
12

was Ye. A. Korovin. In his view, regarding effects on
foreign relations, a "treaty dominates unchallenged and
custom is reduced to an auxiliary source."
In the 1930's, another Soviet scholar, Ye. B. Pashukanis,
continued the molding of international law to fit the Soviet
structure of government and foreign policy. Pashukanis
believed that international treaties and international
customs were sources of international order in a narrow
juridical sense. In a broader sense he stated,
Given the extraordinary instability and indef-
initeness of the volume of universally recog-
nized principles of international law which are
occasionally encountered in our own Soviet notes
and treaties should be interpreted with caution.
In particular, what is involved in Soviet diplo-
matic documents is not the rather indefinite
totality of so-called 'general principles of
international law* taken as a whole, but the sum
of customs which have come into being in the
sphere of specific relations.
2
Pashukanis viewed treaties as acceptable foundations of inter
national relations "between the two systems until the socia-
list system should establish its superiority beyond the
3borders of the USSR." International custom should be
recognized "only within those limitations in which it does
not contradict the dictatorship of the proletariat and the
principles of our foreign policy."
The militancy of Pashukanis' views gradually abated
after the Great Purge. F. I. Kozhevnikov, a professor of
international law, published an article in 1940, on the
subject of sources of international law:
13

The basic external sources of positive in-
ternational law... are, mainly, treaties and
agreements between governments, and inter-
national cus toms . . . . The actual political
relations between governments are transformed
into international law from the moment when
they conclude international agreements, or
from the moment of their adherence to an
already existing treaty, or from the moment
of their official announcement concerning some
rights or obligations, or on the basis of in-
ternational custom.
5
Kozhevnikov' s views were later expanded by S. B. Krylov,
the first Soviet judge in the International Court of Justice.
Krylov proposed four sources of international law:
1. "International treatives , i.e., treaties concluded
between states, are the basic source of international law."
2. International custom facilitates international
intercourse, resting "upon a practice which has extended
over centuries" and in view of the fact that "the content
of ... international treaties does not cover all the problems
7
of law which arise in international intercourse." Of
interest was Krylov' s example of custom as applied to the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
In particular, specific rules for the treatment
of diplomats who are accredited to us have come
into being in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the USSR; in other words, a Soviet diplomatic
practice has been established, Soviet diplomatic
custom. It goes without saying that the protocol
customs of the USSR are democratic and simple....
^
3. Decisions of international organizations, such as
the League of Nations, the United Nations, and other perma-
ment or temporary international agencies which, as a source
of international law, do "not always receive proper attention,
14

despite its great significance and the importance of the
9
role it plays."
4. Domestic legislation and court practice of indi-
vidual nations, only if that legislation or action is
recognized by other states. Krylov subordinated this
source to the other three sources.
A. Ya . Vyshinskii, a prominent spokesman of Soviet
international law, also stressed the importance of the
treaty in international law in 1948:
It must be clear to everyone ... that solid
international law and order can be assured
only on the basis of understanding and the
recognition of the mutual needs, interests,
and rights of sovereign states. That is why
the Soviet theory of international law
regards the treaty, resting on the princi-
ples of the sovereign equality of peoples
and the respect for mutual interests and
rights, as the basic source of international
law. This secures for international law and
its institutions full moral as well as juri-
dicial force, since at their base will lie
the obligations agreed to and voluntarily
assumed by nations >0
In 1955, V. I. Lisovskii authored the first Soviet text-
book on international law since the death of Stalin. In it
he outlined and discussed five sources of international law:
1. Treaties (principle, basic source).
2. Judicial precedents of international courts and
courts of arbitration as well as pertinent decisions of
national courts.
3. International custom.
4. Internal laws - "when they concern or touch upon




5. Decisions and decrees of international organizations
"adopted within the limits of their competence and not con-
tradicting the basic principle of international law... even
for those states that have not taken direct part in their
adoption.
"
The last Soviet scholar to be discussed is V. M. Shurshalov
While continuing the belief that treaties are the basic source
of international law, he also went further:
...contemporary international law is basically
treaty law. It follows that the progressive
development of international law depends to a
significant degree on treaty practice, while
international treaties .. .are at the same time
a factor in its constant rejuvenation and per-
fection. 12
Shurshalov also maintained that a treaty may be in conflict
with the basic principles and concepts of international law,
13
and would be invalid. He defined these values as follows:
1. Universal peace and the security of nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity of nations which are members of the international
community.
3. Noninterference in the internal affairs of states.
4. Equality and mutual benefit between nations.
5. The rigorous fulfillment of obligations assumed under
treaties
.
To summarize the views that have been developed within
the Soviet international law community, and form the present
structure, it is necessary to review two areas: the basic
16

principles and concepts of international law; and the
sources of international law. The basic principles and
concepts include the following:
1. The obligation of keeping and protecting the
general peace and security.
2. International cooperation among all states.
3. National sovereignty and equality.
4. Noninterference in the domestic affairs of other
states
.
5. Maintenance of trade relations.
6. Conscientious fulfillment of international treaties
and obligations.
7. The right to use legal force against violators of
treaties and customary international law.
8. National self-determination.
9. The right to the maintenance of diplomatic relations
10. International legal responsibility for cases of
violation of international law.
11. The right to national respect and honor.
The sources of international law include the following:
1. International treaties and agreements.
2. International custom. Why should "the Soviet govern
ment be deprived of those rights which require no treaty
formulation and derive from the very fact that normal
diplomatic relations exist."
3. Basic concepts and principles.
4. Decisions of international organizations.
17

5. Decisions of national courts.
6. Domestic legislation.
7. Doctrine.
8. Codification of international law.
9. Collision norms (avoidance of bi-lateral confronta-
tions) .
The Soviet theory of international law views the treaty,
resting on the principles of sovereign equality of peoples
and the respect for mutual interests and rights, as the funda-
mental source of international law. The treaty is further
defined as an international agreement among states that
creates rights and obligations in international law. The
treaty is also considered to be the typical and widespread
legal form of struggle or cooperation in the realm of
political, economic and other relations between states,
embodying equality of contracting parties, bilateral accepta-
bility and mutual benefit as basic principles.
Two items should be noted concerning the Soviet theory
stated above: the Soviet use of the term "states" and the
ideological elements of a Soviet treaty. By using the term
"states," the Soviets deny international organizations the
capacity to enter into international treaties.
The concept of ideology has great significance in Soviet
international treaty theory. The Soviets describe the will
of the state of the USSR as expressed through its treaties
17
as "the will of the entire people" who rule that state.
18

Capitalist and imperialist states are described as utilizing
international treaties as a "device of the foreign policy
1
8
of imperialism," and "serves as a form of enslavement by
the most powerful states of the weaker countries and is a
tool for preparing and realizing imperialist expansion and
,,19aggression.
"
The drafting of a treaty involves two important aspects
of Soviet theory: language, and legal terms. In 1945,
before the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations,
Vyacheslav Molotov stated, "I shall speak on this matter in
Russian.... I know that the Russian language is very well
20
suited for a just cause...." The Soviets believe that
the Russian language has become one of the diplomatic
languages because of its "inherent richness and beauty...
21
and the wealth of its potentialities."
Soviet practice adhers to the principle of complete
equality of languages of the contracting parties. Conse-
quently, treaties are drafted for signature in the Russian
language and in the language of the other contracting party.
Legal terminology also plays an important part in
treaty drafting. The Soviets tend to use common phrasing
in many treaties. Normally, this phrasing can be construed
in interpretation to mean "in the interest of the Soviet
Union." The term "democratic principles" can be read as
22
"consent of the Soviet Union." Terms such as nationali-
zation, co-operation, cooperative existence, trusteeship,
mutual benefit, neutrality, and assistance are among
19

the many terms used by the Soviets that can be interpreted
to its advantage. Appendix A lists possible interpretations
of terms and phrases that are common to Soviet Treaties of
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance.
The Soviet practice of treaty formation generally adheres
to the following guideline: negotiations and individual
points of agreement; agreement on treaty text; formal signing
23
of the treaty; ratification by the respective governments.
Within the Soviet Union, ratification of a treaty is a
problem not of "significance in principle, but primarily of
24
state technique." Formal ratification of a treaty is
required only if it is a treaty of peace, a treaty of non-
aggression and mutual assistance, or where ratification
was made a stipulation in the text of the treaty.
The problem of stipulation of a particular length of
time in which ratification or the exchange of acts of rati-
fication must be performed is not dealt within Soviet
doctrine, but is left to the agreement of the contracting
parties. Refusal by a contracting party to ratify a treaty,
without any unfavorable consequences, is a principle "fully
25
recognized by the Soviet science of international law.
"
"Repudiation of a ratified treaty, without extremely
weighty circumstances is at best as international cause
celebre, and may easily be followed by reprisals." This
repudiation, or a nonfulfillment of a treaty obligation,
may bring about intervention: direct, indirect, economic,
20

etc. Soviet policy and practice has been that the injured
party "has the right to employ only those measures that are
permitted by international law and may demand the fulfill-
ment of only those obligations in relation to which the
27guarantee has been established."
In dealing with treaty validity, Soviet theory is based
on the premise that a treaty that is in conflict with the
basic principles and concepts of international law may be
considered invalid. Soviet doctrine sums up these principles
(cited earlier) by condeming and declaring invalid, illegal,
and criminal, a treaty which is regarded as an obstacle to
the further extension of the control of the Soviet foreign
, . 28policy.
Changes in the government of a contracting nation do not
necessarily serve to lawfully terminate or modify a treaty.
Also, with respect to bilateral treaties, war or conflict
abrogates some treaties, suspends the operation of some
treaties and makes other treaties operative. The criterion
for this action is stipulated within the treaty. If it is
29
not, firmly established custom is of great significance.
Nearly all Soviet treaties have a defined period of
operation. The period may be indefinite, such as peace
treaties. The period may be for a limited span of time (10,
20, 30 years), such as Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual
Assistance Treaties. Extensions of the latter treaties may
be a specific agreement or it may be included in the treaty
for a definite or indefinite period.
21

Soviet theory classes international treaties into eight
categories
:
1. Capitalist Treaties: "The most recent techniques
for enslaving people and depriving them of sovereignty,"
and not binding on the Soviet Union.
2. Soviet Treaties With Capitalist States: "The legal
form as well as the veritable legal superstructure over the
objective essential relations ... determined by the coexistence
of states in the capitalist camp with the states of the
31
socialist camp...."
3. Socialist Treaties: "Treaties of an economic
character, together with treaties on political and cultural
32
co-operation of the countries of the socialist camp...."
4. Treaties of Alliance: May be either defensive,
combating aggression, or offensive, advancing aggressions
that are illegal to start with.
5. Treaties of Mutual Assistance: "Obligate the
parties to render mutual aid and support to each other,
including military assistance, in the event one of the
parties becomes the object of an unprovoked attack on the
33part of some third state or states."
6. Treaties of Non-Aggression: "Parties pledge them-
selves to refrain from any attack on each other, either in-
34dividually or in conjunction with one or more other states."
Aggression is defined as a declaration of war, an invasion,
an assault, a naval blockade, or support of armed bands.
22

7. Treaties of Neutrality: "Obligate one or several
states not to take part in a war that may occur between
third countries, and not to convert a territory into a
theater of military operations or into a military base."
8. Regional Treaties: "Open defensive political agree-
ments of a group of states within a geographical region."
Soviet theory and practice of international law has
developed into a valuable and convenient tool of the ruling
government. Soviet treaty practice has almost without excep-
tion determined the general line of the theory of interna-
37tional law.
B. TREATY STRUCTURE
Having established the importance of treaties to Soviet
international law, it is necessary to specifically examine
TOFCMA's with regard to commonality, differences, interpre-
tation and predictability.
Throughout all of the Asian treaties, common terminology
is a standout. The preambles are nearly identical, except
for those treaties with the Communist countries of The
Mongolian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam. The preamble of these two countries also stresses
communist and socialist solidarity and fraternal brotherhood.
As can be seen in Appendix B, all of the treaties stress
friendship, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, world peace,
disarmament, mutual assistance for defense, economic progress,
23

exchange of opinions on international affairs, and ratifica-
tion. All of the Asian treaties have a clause pertaining
to conflict with existing treaties or prohibition of entering
into conflicting treaties. All of the Asian treaties have
a definite period of effectiveness, with automatic renewal
clauses, if neither party states its desire not to renew the
treaty. The length of the initial effective period and the
automatic renewal period varies, but is generally longer
when a treaty is of higher value, at the time of signing, to
the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, India and Mongolia have time
periods of twenty years (compared to fifteen years for Egypt
and Iraq) , whereas the Vietnam treaty has an initial period
of twenty -five years and an automatic renewal period length
of ten years. Mongolia also has a renewal period of ten years.
Of particular importance to the Soviet Union is interpre-
tation of the treaties so that it is permitted to supply
military aid and training, troops, or intervention. In the
treaties with Mongolia and Vietnam, there are three separate
clauses that permit military aid or intervention. There is
the standard clause of offering immediate assistance if the
other party is either threatened or attacked by a third state,
or states (Afghanistan Art. 4, Vietnam Art. 6). Another
clause is the rendering to one another of fraternal aid and
support (Mongolia Art. 1, Vietnam preamble and Art. 1). The
last clause that would permit military aid or intervention
says that necessary steps to defend socialist gains will be
24

undertaken as needed (Mongolia Art. 5, Vietnam Art. 4). In
the Mongolian treaty (Mongolia Art. 5) is a clause to defend
to ensure security, independence and territorial integrity
of the country, using military measures if necessary.
Military aid, assistance, or intervention in the other
treaties is confined largely to the clause of mutual assis-
tance if threatened or attached (India Art. 9) or co-operation
in the military field in increases of defense capability
(Afghanistan Art. 4). History has proven that the Soviet
Union stretches this clause to meet its needs. India receives
military aid from the Soviets even though it is not being
attacked nor immediately threatened. Afghanistan receives
military aid under the pretext of being attacked from rebel
forces external to the country. In both cases, the Soviet
aim appears to be containment of, or a lessening of, Chinese
influence and support of a pro-Soviet government. Addition-
ally, support to Afghanistan provides the necessary material
to keep the pro-Soviet government in power.
A comment should be made at this point on what appears
to be a significant change in terminology, and possible
intentions. In all the pre-1978 treaties, a clause was
enclosed in Art. 1 that support non- interference in internal
affairs. In the Soviet-Vietnamese, the clause was changed
to non-interference in international affairs. This leaves
the way open for the Soviet Union to insure that the Chinese
do not gain any control in Vietnam.
25

The primary objectives that have influenced the Soviet
drive to conclude these treaties, and possible future ones
can be divided into three categories; objectives dealing
with Soviet security, objectives dealing with geography,
and objectives dealing with politics.
The objectives dealing with Soviet security are the
establishment of a security/buffer zone and controlling
those states in that zone. The objectives of geographical
nature include containment of the People's Republic of China,
spreading Soviet influence, and obtaining access to valuable
resources and resource routes. The objectives in politics
include strengthening of communism and socialism and
lessening the influence of other major nations (People's
Republic of China, United States). (See TABLE I.)
With a study of Table I, geography and strategic posi-
tioning appear to be the dominating influences. All the
treaties are aimed at strengthening pro-Soviet governments,
and increasing Soviet influence. In North, Southeast and
South Asia, the Soviet Union's primary objective appears to
be the containment of the People's Republic of China and
causing abatement of Chinese influence. In West and South
Asia, the Soviets' primary objective appears to be the
strategic position in the world and access to natural
resources, and support for pro-Soviet governments. A
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In general these treaties have benefits for each country,
but the Soviet Union is in a position to obtain much more
benefit in support of its foreign policy. With the wide
geographical positions of these treaties, and its willing-
ness to interpret the treaties to its advantage, the Soviet
Union can spread its dominance and control throughout Asia
to the benefit of the Soviet Union and its communist party.
Interpretation is also very important. Most of the
articles and phrases are deliberately vague or general.
This permits both the Soviet Union and the other signatory
to have a wide scope of legality in which to pursue its
foreign policy and act with or against the other. Appendix A
provides an interpretation of Soviet definitions of the
main clauses of these treaties.
The last section of this chapter will outline the steps
needed to predict if a TOFCMA will be a socialist or non-
socialist oriented. It is necessary to identify the varia-
bles that can be studied, that result in such a TOFCMA, and
how these variables' relationships determine whether the
treaty will be socialist or non-socialist oriented.
The Soviet Union regards these treaties as providing
for a degree of economic and military security, as well as
providing an avenue for increasing political influence. The
degree of protection and influence provided is generally
greater in a socialist-oriented TOFCMA. A socialist-
oriented TOFCMA specifically calls for fraternal aid and
28

support, building socialism and communism, and armed
assistance, when other TOFCMA'S make no such specific
provisions
.
The variables that influence the tyne of TOFCMA are as
follows: (Consider the Soviet Union as the first party.)
1. Perceived Opponent: Does the Soviet Union perceive
one country, or an alliance of countries, as a threat?
(Threat is defined as being anti-communist, or having the
capability of conducting economic disruption of or military
operations against the Soviet Union.)
2. Geographic Location to Perceived Opponent: Is the
second party geographically located near (or contiguous to)
or far from the perceived opponent?
3. Relations With Perceived Opponent: What is the
status of relations between the second party and the perceived
opponent? Good or bad?
4. Strategic Location: Does the second party occupy a
strategic location: military, political or economic?
5. Buffer State Location: Is the second party geo-
graphically located to be utilized as a buffer state by the
Soviet Union?
6. Power Politics: Is the Soviet Union attempting to
counter, change or negate the influence/prestige of a rival
power or perceived opponent?
7. Type Government: Is the government of the second
party socialist or communist?
29

8. Status of Government: Is the government of the
second party newly established and/or in need of assistance
(military, economic or political)?
The above listed variables determine if a TOFCMA is
likely to be concluded and whether or not the treaty will
be socialist oriented. To determine the orientation it is
necessary to identify the relationships of the variables
and their influence.
The Soviet Union utilizes TOFCMA' s for two primary ob-
jectives: to obtain positions of political and military
strength for the strengthening of their strategic and diplo-
matic position; and "the development of political influence
and economic and military might of the world socialist
system." This is accomplished in part by the peacefulness
or violence of "the present national liberation movement of
the peoples ... that .. .has become an organic integral part of
39
world revolutionary process."
With these stated objectives of the Soviet Union, it is
obvious that the classes of variables that have the most
influence on a TOFCMA are perceived opponents, strategic
location and government support. Table II lists the classes
of variables and the relationships of the variables. A
general TOFCMA evolution diagram (Fig. 1) and a socialist-
oriented TOFCMA evolution diagram (Fig. 2) provide the matrix
for predicting if a treaty is likely, and if so, which type
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KEY: 1 - Is "Opponent" class socialist?
2 - Is "strategic Location" class socialist?
3 - Is "Strategic Location" class socialist?
4 - Is "Government" class socialist?
5 - Is "Government" class socialist?
6 - Socialist-oriented TOFCMA
7 - Is "Power Politics" class socialist?
8 - No socialist-oriented TOFCMA
Figure 2. Evolution of a Socialist-Oriented TOFCMA.
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By studying Figs. 1 and 2, note that any three classes
of variables can lead to a TOFCMA, but any grouping of
classes containing only single variables cannot lead to a
socialist-oriented TOFCMA. Only when variables of at least
three classes have moved into the socialist column (Table II)
will a socialist-oriented TOFCMA be concluded (Fig. 2).
In the first class of variables, perceived opponents,
only a combination of the second parties ' geographic location
(near) and poor relations with the perceived opponent will
result in a socialist-oriented TOFCMA. In the strategic
location class of variables, only a combination of the
variables concerning military, economic or political aspects
result in a socialist-orientating factor. In the government
class, only combinations of a socialist government requiring
assistance, a new socialist government, or a new socialist
government requiring assistance give this class a socialist
orientation. Of the two final classes, only a combination
of countering, changing , or negating influence and prestige
in power politics results in socialist possibilities.
A state that can be a buffer state may have a socialist
treaty to allow for tighter Soviet control but this is not
a determining factor in a socialist/non-socialist orientation,
only that a TOFCMA may be concluded.
The requirement for grouping the variables in classes to
produce a socialist orientation is based on the combining of
factors that together are of great importance to the Soviet
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Union as cited previously regarding Soviet objectives.
When utilized singly without the influence of other
variables within the class, the variables tend to be of
general interest only.
With these variables and classes it should be possible
to predict if the conditions are suitable for a Treaty of
Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance and then
predict its orientation and consequently the level of




II. ASIAN TOFCMA'S ANALYSIS
Having established the importance of treaties in the
system of Soviet International Law, and reviewed the types
of and phrasing in the Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation
and Mutual Assistance,* the next step is the examination of
the four Asian TOFCMAM s: internal problems of the Asian
signatories; historical relations with the Soviet Union,
changes within the Asian signatories that may have resulted
due to the TOFCMA.
A. AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan is one of four nations to be examined.
Afghanistan exhibits the model that can be used to examine
the other three nations as outlined above.
1 . Problem Areas
Afghanistan is a landlocked nation that is a melting
pot of Asian cultures. Because of this, the Afghan govern-
ment faces numerous problems: social and cultural, economic,
and security. Perhaps the most dominating problem is the
social and cultural diversity of the country. Founded as
an independent nation in 1747, the diverse ethnic and
linguistic groups within its boundaries have prevented
Afghanistan from modernizing and becoming a unified nation.




many of these people must move with the seasonal changes in
weather, while seventeen per cent of this group belong to
shifting nomadic tribes.
The ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Afghan
people is marked. The languages of Afghanistan are derived
from two basic sources. One source is the Indo-European
family which includes Pashto, Dari, Indie, Dardic and
Dravidian, with the Iranian variants of Pashto and Dari being
the country's principle languages. The other source of
Afghani language groups is the Ural-Altaic family. These
are the Turkic languages that are spoken in northern
Afghanistan which include Turkic, Uzbek and Kirghiz.
Approximately half of the population is Pastuns,
speaking Pashto, an Iranian variant of the Indo-European
language family, and lives in the southern regions of
Afghanistan. Other major ethnic groups include the Tagiks
(speaking an Iranian language derivative called Dari)
,
Uzbeks (speaking Uzbek and Dari), Hazaras, Turkamans
,
Chahar Aimaks and Baluchis . Their group, language, and
location are as shown in TABLE III.
While the many diverse ethnic and linguistic groups
pose a major obstacle in the consolidation of a nation-
state, there is a potentially greater unifying force in the
Afghan religious beliefs. Ninety-nine per cent of the Afghan
population belong to the Islamic faith. Eighty per cent of
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which includes most of the Hazara and Kizilbash ethnic
groups and some of the Tajics, belong to the Shiite sect.
Another major problem for the Afghan government is
the agricultural economy. Because of the heavy reliance on
this as the primary mode of living in a harsh terrain, and
only eleven inches of average annual rainfall, Afghanistan
cannot rapidly modernize and industrialize. Agricultural
products provide ninety per cent of Afghan exports. These
include, in rank of order: fresh and dried fruit and nuts,
sheep skins, raw cotton, carpets and rugs, and raw wool.
While these products provide a moderate source of foreign
exchange, it is hardly enough to meet the needs of the nation
for modernization, and is barely enough to meet the nation's
survival needs
.
Afghanistan is nearly self-sufficient in producing
food-stuffs, with an arable land area of three per cent;
when drought occurs, the country's vulnerability is very
apparent. The country must import sugar, tea, fabrics,
petroleum products, motor vehicles, rubber goods, machinery
2
and chemical products.
The need for Afghanistan to improve its agricultural
production is great. The present lack of education, financial
institution, ethnic diversity and lack of incentives keep
the agrarian economy from providing the needed capital for
modernization.

Afghan industry is based on processing agricultural
products. The largest of these, the cotton textile industry,
does not meet the internal needs of the country. Attempts
to expand industry meet obstacles that are difficult to
overcome such as: external resources that are subject to
closure from Pakistan and Iran, few sources of electrical
power, poor transportation, lack of transportation, lack of
marketing channels and little managerial and technical
skills
.
Many of the problems that obstruct industrial growth
are gradually met. Currently, Afghanistan is mining coal,
salt, lapis lazuli and natural gas. Hydro-electric generating
plants are gradually being built, but these and other in-
dustrial advances require capital which Afghanistan does
not have.
While there are perils in this marginal economy, the
country's vulnerability in its foreign relations is even
greater. Afghanistan has historically been a nation caught
in the middle of expanding empires, and it has attempted to
maintain a neutral stand. Until the April 1978 coup,
Afghanistan maintained a slack, non-aligned status, but with
the signing of the Soviet-Afghanistan TOFCMA on December 5,
1978, the country moved into the Soviet camp.
Adding to this is a plague of problems based on
ethnic unrest. The most serious area of tension is the
Pashtunistan area of eastern Afghanistan which overlaps
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western Pakistan; here a contest has developed over the
joining Afghanistan or Pakistan rather than being divided,
as it is at present. Another ethnic area that is poten-
tially disruptive is Baluchistan, which overlaps southern
Afghanistan, southwest Pakistan and southeast Iran. In
both of these troubled areas are ethnic groups that are
primarily nomads, using violence to obtain their needs and
wants and then fleeing into a neighboring country to avoid
pursuit
.
2 . International Security Relations
Afghanistan's policy of neutrality far ante-
dates the events which have given rise to
the term 'non-alignment.' Afghanistan has
traditionally followed a policy of impartial
judgment through many years, and has never
deviated from this course, even during the
world wars. The establishment and mainte-
nance of friendly relations with all peoples
and nations and promotion of international
cooperation are important factors in our
traditional political behavior.
3
This was how Sardar Mohammed Daoud, Prime Minister of
Afghanistan, summed up over two hundred years of Afghan
foreign relations before the first summit meeting of non-
aligned countries in Belgrade in September, 1961.
During the first one hundred years of its existence,
the Afghan empire was consolidated and strengthened. In
1809, Dost Mohammed Khan concluded an Anglo-Afghan Treaty
which was largely a British effort to cut off Russian
invasion routes into India. In 1837, Dost Mohammed Khan
appealed for further British aid against Iran which had
40

attacked Herat with Russian approval. The British refused
to give him assistance because of suspected Afghan involve-
ment in the Sikh Peshawar area. In 1838, the British
invaded Afghanistan to install a pro-British ruler, thus
launching the First Anglo-Afghan War which ended with the
expeditionary forces being massacred in 1842.
With the end of the conflict, Dost Mohammed Khan was
returned to power by Great Britain. As he began to consoli-
date his country and unite his people, Dost Mohammed Khan
was forced to maintain friendly relations with the British
because of Russian ambitions in Crimea and central Asia.
The Treaty of Paris, which ended the Crimean War on March 4,
1857, brought recognition of Afghanistan as an independent
nation by Russia and Great Britain. The ensuing twenty
years saw Russia spreading its influence to the Afghan
border, but the Amir, Sher Ali, began to modernize his
army, with British insistence. The Amir's leaning toward
Russia led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1879) in
which British forces took over the country and dictated
the Treaty of Gandamak , May 16, 1879, by which the British
gained the Khyber Pass and suzerainty over Afghanistan.
In 1885 the Russians invaded Afghanistan north of Herat and
reached a point of war with Great Britain. Conflict was
averted by a border settlement between the two countries.
Russia agreed to withdraw from its farthest point of
advance at Zulfigar, and would be allowed to keep Panjdeh.
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Russia gained the territory it wanted and Great Britain
stopped the advance without a war at the expense of
Afghanistan. In 1895 an Anglo-Russian Pact established
the Wakhan Strip as a permanent part of Afghanistan, thus
7demarkating the northern tip of Afghan-Russian border to
separate the Russian and British Indian Empires.
In 1907 Afghanistan again gained partial control of
its government and partially rid itself of outside influences
On August 31, 1907, the Anglo-Russian Convention of St.
Petersburg made a comprehensive settlement of Anglo-Russian
differences
:
a. Afghanistan became a buffer state whose
integrity would be respected by both nations.
b. Russia agreed to deal with the Amir only
through Great Britain.
c. Afghanistan was excluded from the Russian
sphere of influence.
During World War I Afghanistan attempted to remain
neutral but it temporized with a German mission in 1915
that sought Afghan support. While the Amir was favorable
to the German viewpoint, he decided to avoid a confronta-
tion with the British and the Russians. The rise of
internal tensions, nationalism, and the desire of the new
Amin, Amanullah, to divert internal discontent toward an
enemy led to an Afghan attack on British forces and the
9
Third Anglo-Afghan War, May-August 1919.
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This third war ended with the Treaty of Rawalpindi
on August 8, 1919, and gave complete British recognition
to Afghan independence and brought about a new increase
in anti-British sentiment, which culminated on February 28,
1921, with the signing of an Afghan-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship. Late in 1921, another treaty was signed
between Afghanistan and Great Britain reaffirming Afghan
independence and agreeing to the exchange of diplomats
.
During the next fifty years, Afghanistan pursued
a policy of neutrality. In 1926 an Afghan-Soviet Treaty
of Neutrality and Non-aggression was signed. During
World War II Afghanistan remained neutral. In 1948 the
Soviets and Afghans peacefully demarcated the last of
12their unmarked joint borders. With the break-up of the
British Indian Empire and withdrawal of British forces,
the Indian subcontinent was without a major power to
counterbalance Russian influence and aspirations, thus
complicating Afghanistan's attempts of maintaining neutrality
This policy of neutrality was also evident in
Afghanistan's search for aid and assistance for moderniza-
tion from all parts of the world. United States' aid
began in 1949 with a $21 million loan for development and
reached $350 million by 1970 when U.S. aid was drastically
reduced. Soviet aid began as early as 1921 with a $250,000
subsidy and ammunition. Soviet aid blossomed in 1950 with
trade agreements and exploration agreements. Direct loans
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were made by the Soviets starting in 1954. By 1955 the
Soviets had loaned over $113 million for construction of
mills, silos, storage tanks, pipelines, and had given the
Afghans a one-hundred bed hospital. Soviet aid to
Afghanistan has totaled nearly $1.5 billion between 1950
and 1978. 15
In an effort to avoid dependence on the Soviet
Union, Afghanistan also sought aid from other communist and
non-communist sources. By the end of 1966, West German
loans totaled $54.4 million as well as grants totaling over
$3 million. Aid has also been received from Great Britain,
India, Czechoslovakia, China and others.
The most effective aid, and the most influential
within Afghanistan, was military training, advisors and
equipment. With the United States' reluctance to provide
military assistance, Afghanistan sought and received its
military aid almost entirely from the Soviet Union. This
included the training of Afghan officers in the Soviet
Union, general military training of the Afghan army,
massive transfers of arms, technological assistance, and
repair support.
Afghanistan's neutrality shifted to a pro-Soviet
stance with the April 1978 coup that installed Noor Mohammed
Taraki, leader of the communist Khalq party, as head of the
Afghan government. The country attempted to maintain its
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neutrality, but its problems were attacked with the type of
foreign aid that began to prove effective, and was supplied
by the Soviet Union.
Soviet support of the Afghan government continued
to grow, even as Taraki, and later Amin , espoused their
continuance of the policy of neutrality. The signing of
the Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA on December 5, 1978, legitimized
this support, particularly the military aspects as outlined
in Article 4:
The high contracting parties , acting in
the spirit of the traditions of friendship
and good neighbourliness, as well as the
U.N. Charter, shall consult each other and
take by agreement appropriate measures to
ensure the security, independence, and
territorial integrity of the two countries.
In the interests of strengthening the
defence capacity of the high contracting
parties they shall continue to develop
cooperation in the military field on the
basis of appropriate agreements concluded
between them.l°
The climax of Soviet support appears to have occurred during
the December 28, 1979, coup when Soviet troops and equipment
entered Afghanistan in support of the new government.
Brezhnev's statement concerning the Afghan action summed up
the Soviet view:
It's a small police action designed to
restore order to a country that appealed
for our assistance twice before under ,g
the provisions of our friendship treaty....
Thus the Soviets justified their actions with the Soviet-
Afghan TOFCMA which demonstrate a useful effect of the treaty.
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3 . Treaty Effects
The quantitative measurements of the effects of the
Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA are not available yet, but can be
estimated for Afghanistan's economic and military status.
The subjective views of changes can be accomplished more
readily, particularly in the realm of politics and foreign
affairs. In the sphere of economics, Afghanistan has
received much assistance from the Soviet Union. (See
Appendix C.) This assistance in the form of aid, loans,
credits, gifts, technological advisors, has resulted in
more than eighty projects including road building,
fertilizer plants, schools, irrigation, hydro-electric and
thermal power plants, airport construction, mineral explora'
tion and exploitation, and hospital construction. Soviet
economic aid has not shown any signs of change as of yet.
However, since the signing of the Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA,
there has been no evidence of new major contributions on
the part of the Soviet Union to aid the Afghan government
in reaching a sound economic footing.
Another economic aspect to watch for a change is
the trade figures and trade pattern between the Soviet
Union and Afghanistan. Previously Afghanistan exported
agricultural products and some minerals (primarily natural
gas) to the Soviet Union and received machinery, consumer
goods and petroleum products. As of December 1979, there
has been no change in this pattern.
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The other trade factor that could indicate a change
resulting from the Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA is the monetary trade
balance between the two nations. As seen in Appendix C,
Afghan exports to the Soviet Union have been steadily in-
creasing, but the percentage of these exports of total
Afghan exports has only increased slightly. However,
imports from the Soviet Union have increased but at a slower
rate, while the percentage of imports has actually declined.
It is possible to estimate that the Soviet export percentage
will begin to decrease for the period after the TOFCMA was
signed, when the statistics become available. The imports
percentage may also continue its slight decline or level off
at a lower percentage rate.
The other category that is difficult to quantify at
this stage in Soviet-Afghan relations is the arms trade
and military expenditures. Appendix D shows these statistics
and it is possible to discern some trends. While military
expenditures show some fluctuation, after 1970 there has
been an increasing trend in expenditures. During the same
period there has also been an increase in the amount of
arms sales made to Afghanistan. This follows a pattern
that has been previously established to linking arms sales
to a moderate control over the recipient's military expen-
20ditures. Since the Soviet Union provided ninety-five
per cent of the arms sales to Afghanistan between 1973 and
1978, this would give the Soviet Union some control over
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the Afghan military budget. If Afghanistan follows the
pattern concerning arms trade, statistics will show a
decline in the amount of money expended on arms, with a
corresponding decline in military expenditures, and an
increase in the quality of arms received, as with the first
time arrival of armored helicopter gunships from the Soviet
Union in 1979. 21
In addition to possible military budget control,
the Soviets have also provided the military training and
repairs necessary on Afghan military equipment. This gives
the Soviet Union a means to influence, and possibly control,
the direction of the Afghan armed forces, as was the case
during the December 1979 coup, when Afghanistan's armed
forces were neutralized.
The area where changes have occurred since the
signing of the Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA is that of politics and
diplomatic support. In a press conference on May 6, 1978,
Premier Taraki stated:
We are not a satellite of anyone.... We
are non-aligned and independent, and
no country will have any justification
to interfere in our internal affairs....
We will have friendly relations with any
country that is prepared to offer polit-
ical and economic aid to the revolutionary
government . 2 2
Less than two years later, in the Summer of 1979, Taraki
stated:
Any Afghan who ignors Russian support to
his country cannot be a patriot. Love of
Country demands affection for anyone sup-
porting national development, and in that




The final and most conclusive evidence of the change
in Afghanistan's non-aligned status and the effect of the
Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA occurred during the December 28, 1979,
coup that installed Babrak Karmal as the Afghan leader.
According to The Current Digest of Soviet Press, on December 28
Radio Kabul broadcasted a statement by the government of the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan:
The DRA government, taking into account the
continuing and broadening interference and
provocations by external enemies of
Afghanistan and with a view to protecting
the gains of the April revolution, terri-
torial integrity and national independence
and maintaining peace and security, and
proceeding from the December 5, 1978 Treaty
of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Co-
operation, has asked the USSR for urgent
political, moral and economic assistance,
including military assistance, which the
government of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan had earlier repeatedly requested
from the government of the Soviet Union. 24
The request is supposedly based on Article 4 of the treaty
which calls for appropriate measures to ensure the security,
independence and territorial integrity of the contracting
parties
.
Because of the relatively short period of time that
the treaty has been in effect, it is difficult to quantita-
tively distinguish changes resulting from the treaty,
because of the lack of empirical data. Based on previous
indications from other TOFCMA' s, Afghanistan appears to be
following the same general pattern concerning economics and
military matters. The major departure from the previous
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trends is the invoking of the military clause of the treaty
to allow Soviet, armed forces to enter into actual combat in
another country. It will be necessary to continue observa-
tions to see how this will affect Afghanistan's development.
B. INDIA
Of the four nations being examined, India is the most
neutral and farthest along in its modernization program.
India's prospects for the success of these programs depends
on its ability to solve its internal problems.
1 . Problem Areas
India is plagued with religious and ethnic unrest
and has a wide variety of languages. The languages listed
in Table IV except for "others," are official languages
for use in state administration, as declared in the Indian
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Although it has a large number of languages, this
does not cause the government major problems. The internal
ethnic problems occur primarily in Nagaland and Mizaram of
25
western India. Both groups have continually demanded
autonomy and the right to establish an independent states.
The situation produces high regional tensions that occa-
sionally overflow into the neighboring nations of Burma and
Bangladesh.
Another source of internal problems is the Moslem
population. Although comprising only 11.2 per cent of the
population, the Moslems of India belong to one of the three
27
or four largest Islamic communities in the world. Because
of this large Moslem community, the Indian government must
be favorably responsive to the problems of the Moslem world,
particularly in the Mid-East.
Another situation that faces the Indian government
is its own political instability. Indira Gandhi won re-
election as Prime Minister on January 4, 1980, after being
ousted from that seat thirty-three months previously.
Mrs. Gandhi's platform was to put leadership and stability
back into the government, from which the electorate may
oust her again if she fails to act quickly. One of
Mrs. Gandhi's major tasks will be to get India's economy
back on solid footing. India was progressing well with its
modernization programs, until a 1979 drought, along with
instability within the government, caused serious setbacks
51

Inflation soared to 10.2% (from 0.91). A trade deficit
reappeared. Shortfalls occurred in mining, transportation
28
and production of electricity. These shortfalls not only
hindered internal progress, they also slowed the flows of
raw materials from outside sources that are needed for the
modernization process.
The centerpiece of this modernization process is
industrial improvement. The industry, which includes
29
mining, quarrying, power, construction and manufacturing,
has been the object of continued attempts of expansion.
These efforts have led to inadequate production caused by
poor management, labor problems, obsolescence, the funneling
of capital into military improvement and insufficient capi-
tal inflow from agricultural related exports. These exports,
including cotton textiles, tea, leather and leather goods,
coffee, tobacco and cashew kernals comprise approximately
31
sixty per cent of India's total exports.
Although one purpose of India's modernization plan
is to improve the living standard of its population, the
population growth is "so fast that the current technology
32
cannot absorb the annual increment." The current popula-
tion if 636 million is growing at an annual rate of 1.8 per
33
cent and increasingly taxes the agricultural economy as




Agriculture continues to be the primary source of
income for seventy per cent of India's population. Programs
have been initiated to increase productivity and crop yield
through management, high yield crops, irrigation projects,
but these techniques will only succeed if properly utilized.
This involves educating the farmers and growers, a tremendous
task. In addition to these techniques is the problem of
dependence on the monsoon rains to deliver the required
moisture for crop raising, and the consequential threat of
floods or droughts
.
India's economic problems are overshadowed by its
international relations, and its attempt to champion the
non-aligned movement. While purporting to remain neutral
and non-aligned, India has been able to obtain much assis-
tance from the Soviet Union, particularly in the military
field. This aid and other types of support have not aided
India with its south Asian relations.
India has less success with regard to its relations
with its neighbors. India maintains correct but cool
relations with Nepal. Relations with Bangladesh have been
warm, but there have been tensions over treatment of
Bengalis in the areas around Bangladesh. Relations
between India and China which have previously broken down
into a border war and tensions are presently improving.
The continued improvement of Sino-Indian relations are
always subject to the pressures created by Chinese aid to
Pakistan. Indian-Pakistani relations remained strained
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because of the unsettled Kashmir issue and Pakistan's in-
sistance on building a strong military force (including the
possible development of nuclear arms) and military links
with the United States.
It is because of the threat of war with Pakistan
and possibly China that India has built up a formidable
military force, and must continue its modernization. This
necessity drains much needed capital from economic improve-
ment programs, particularly during periods of poor economic
performance, as in late 1978 and 1979. Because of this
military requirement, India must also ensure that it can
obtain needed supplies quickly, and turned to the Soviet
Union for assistance.
2 . International Security Relations
Relations with the Soviet Union have grown into a
working relationship that is beneficial to both nations
.
After a slow beginning, due to Soviet criticisms, in the
early 1950 's of non-aligned and neutral states, the two
nations began to express views of cordiality. In June
1955 Nehru made the first state visit of a non-communist
government leader to Moscow in peacetime. This was
followed by a visit to India by Krushchev in December 1955
37
and an endorsement of India's foreign policy.
The 1960 * s brought about continued increasingly
friendly relations between India and the Soviet Union.
Diplomatically, the Soviet Union supported India in the
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United Nations Security Council on the issues arising out
of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The
Soviet Union sponsored the Tashkent Conference in January
1966, in an attempt to stop the fighting between India and
Pakistan. While only partially successful, the Soviets
38
were able to end that conflict in the Asian subcontinent.
In addition to the Soviet role as arbiter at Tashkent,
both the Soviet Union and India supported each other during
the 1960's. On September 19 and 20, 1969, PRAVDA voiced the
Soviet government's appreciation for the continuation of the
"policy of non-alignment and friendship with the Soviet
Union," and India acknowledged the Soviet Union's help and
39
cooperation in "economic and other matters." Although
both nations were cooperating in many areas, India still
attempted to maintain a facade of neutrality. When Brezhnev
proposed a collective security system for Asia, Indian Foreign
Minister Singh commented in September 1969, "India welcomes
the proposal ... .The essence of the Soviet plan is the develop-
ment of cooperation among the Asian countries for the purposes
of strengthening peace." In December Singh clarified the
Indian position as resting on economic cooperation and not
the use of major power military forces guarding the security
40
of South Asia, especially under a military agreement.
Cooperation between the Soviet Union and India was
enhanced on August 9, 1971, with the signing of the Soviet-
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Indian TOFCMA. Measures to ensure the security of each
nation are detailed in Article 9:
Each of the high contracting parties
undertakes to refrain from giving any
assistance to any third party taking
part in an armed conflict with the other
party. In case either of the parties is
attacked or threatened with attack, the
high contracting parties shall immediately
start mutual consultations with a view to
eliminating this threat and taking appro-
priate effective measures to ensure peace
and security for their countries. 41
The immediate effect of the treaty was evident in
the Bangladesh crisis that was developing between India and
Pakistan, and was summarized by Henry Kissinger:
The Soviet Union .. .actively encouraged
war by signing the Friendship Treaty,
giving diplomatic support to India's
maximum demands, airlifting military
supplies, and pledging to veto incon-
venient resolitions in the U.N. Security
Council. The Soviets encouraged India
to exploit Pakistan's travail in part to
deliver a blow to our system of alliances,
in even greater measure to demonstrate
Chinese importance .4 2
The Soviet support of the Indian position was further evidenced
by Mrs. Gandhi's discussions within the Indian government:
Mrs. Gandhi also told colleagues that
if the Chinese rattled the sword, the
S<
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loviets had promised to take appropriat<
:ounte raction. 4^
Kissinger credits India, encouraged by the Soviets,
as utilizing a ruthless power play to use:
The fragility of the Pakistani govern-
ment and the fragility of the Pakistani
political structure to force a solution
of the East Pakistan crisis by military




The United States used the Soviet influence on India to
bring an end to the conflict, and prevent a major outbreak
of war between India and West Pakistan, by stationing a task
force in the Indian Ocean and threatening intervention if
India attacked West Pakistan.
The Soviet support of India throughout the Bangladesh
crisis and India's reliance on the Soviets removed the facade
of non-alignment. This shift away from neutrality caused
concern to be expressed within India as to its future as a
non-aligned nation. In July 1972 Professor Bhabani Sen Gupta
wrote:
Taking advantage of the U.S. predicament
in Southeast Asia and on the domestic front,
and of the leadership crisis in China, the
USSR has succeeded in bringing South Asia
within the expanding orbit of its Asian
sphere of influence ... .The U.S. virtually
recognized the subcontinent as a Soviet
sphere of influence. 45
He went on to say:
The fact remains that much of the recent
accretion to India's influence is the
result of the powerful support that it
received from the U.S.S.R.^^
In the Spring of 1977, newly appointed Foreign Minister
Vajpayee declared:
At one time we gave the impression that we
were pro-American. Then we gave the im-
pression we were pro-Soviet. There must
be a change in which we are genuinely non-
aligned. 4 i
The desire to regain its non-alignment is also evident
in India's arms purchases. Since the early 1960 's, India made
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major purchases of Soviet arms (see Appendix D) and obtained
48licenses to produce several types of Soviet equipment:
a. Mig-21FL: Produced under license since 1967.
Currently produces 60 per cent of aircraft.
b. Mig-21MF: Produced under license since 1972.
Currently produces 60 per cent of aircraft.
c. K-13 (Atoll): Produced under license since 1967.
Armament for Mig-21. India continues to purchase major new
arms from the Soviet Union (KA-25 helicopters, submarines,
NANUCHKA missile ships, KASHIN DDG's, ASW patrol aircraft,
anti-ship missiles)
.
This Soviet aid continues but India is gaining addi-
tional sources for its military equipment to avoid becoming
dependent on a single supplier. Most notable was the 1978
decision to purchase the Anglo-French Jaguar strike aircraft.
The entire package included the outright purchase of forty
aircraft, initial licensed production of sixty aircraft and
purchase of an agreed proportion of spare parts and ancillary
equipment. The total cost of this Jaguar deal, the largest
single arms transaction in India's history, is estimated
49between $1.5-$2.0 billion.
Relations between the Soviet Union and India remain
friendly and warm. The Soviet Union continues to offer
economic (often in a timely manner in periods of economic
distress in India), military aid and diplomatic support.
India provides the Soviet Union with an example of friendship
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and cooperation between the Soviets and an Asian neighbor
for all to see. India also provides diplomatic support
while attempting to maintain its non-aligned status.
3. Treaty Effects
The effects of the TOFCMA between India and the
Soviet Union are several. The treaty appears to be a
statement of solidarity and cooperation and the result
of years of friendship and cooperation, rather than a
device to be utilized for building friendship and cooperation.
There are two areas where trend changes can be fixed
to the treaty. The first of these areas deals with the Indo-
Soviet trade relations. While the trend of Soviet economic
aid and assistance offered to India has not changed, the
trends of exports and imports between the two nations has
changed. The Soviet percentage of India's total annual
exports (see Appendix C) increased until the treaty was
signed and then began a gradual decline. The Soviet per-
centage of India's total annual imports remained fairly
constant, except for.the three year period immediately prior
to the signing of the treaty when it declined slightly.
These trends indicate the Soviet use of trade as a tool to
gain its desires
.
The other area where a change in trends is observa-
ble is military expenditures and arms trade. (See Appendix D.)
Arms sales between 1964 and 1971 exhibited a steady to slightly
increasing trend of monetary expenditures. After 1971 arms
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sales declined until 1974 before beginning to rise again.
This decline in arms sales to India also shows up in a
decline of military expenditures between 1971 and 1974,
again demonstrating some control by the arms seller over
the recipient's military budget. At the same time that the
arms trade and military expenditures were declining (after
the treaty declined) India received (or was able to order)
Soviet equipment of superior quality that was previously not
available: Mig-21MF, Mig-23, YAK-36, 11-38, MI - 8 , SSN-2,
SSN-9, SSN-11, SA-6, NANUCHKA missile ship, OSA PTG,
KASHIN DDG. 50
Diplomatically, the Soviet-Indian TOFCMA climaxed
Indo-Soviet collaboration. Within a year of the treaty
signing, prominent Indian leaders and officials expressed
concern about India's neutrality, and began to move the
country towards a more neutral position, while at the
same time ensuring the continued good relations with the
Soviet Union.
In the diplomatic realm, India was one of the few
nations that did not criticize the use of Soviet military
forces during the December 1979 coup in Afghanistan. This
support may have roots in a complex situation based on the
Afghan TOFCMA and the Indian TOFCMA. The Soviet presence
in Afghanistan would permit immediate support for India
(under Article 9) in the event of an Indo-Pakistani war.
With this support from the west, India would be able to
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totally defeat Pakistan and move much closer to its ambition
of unifying South Asia under Indian control. India would
achieve undisputed control of Kashmir, the Indus River and
would seek the establishment of a buffer area in Pakistan
between itself and Soviet dominated Afghanistan.
The benefits for the Soviet Union are great. The
Soviets would gain considerable influence over South Asia
through its treaties with India and Afghanistan. They would
be able to virtually eliminate Chinese influence in South
Asia and complete the western portion of the Soviet system
of Chinese containment. Most importantly, the Soviet Union
would be able to control the Baluchistan region of Pakistan
and gain unlimited use of the Pakistani Indian Ocean ports.
C. MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
Of the nations being studied, Mongolia has the oldest
treaty of the present Soviet TOFCMA's, which was signed on
January 15, 1966. Because of its earlier drafting, the Soviet
Mongolian TOFCMA does not have many of the specific clauses
that the newer Asian TOFCMA's have concerning conduct of
relations (see Appendix B)
.
1 . Problem Areas
The problems that face Mongolia do not include internal
unrest due to ethnic and linguistic diversity. Over eighty
per cent of the Mongolian population is of Mongolian ancestry.




One of the potential problem areas is that of modern-
ization. Mongolia's economy is based on agriculture, partic-
ularly animal husbandry. As late as the late 1960 's, ninety
per cent of Mongolia's exports were animal products: meat,
52down and hair, hides and skins, while maintaining food
production for internal consumption.
By being self-sufficient in food production, Mongolia
is attempting to industrialize and become less dependent on
agricultural products for trade. Current emphasis is being
placed on the food stuffs industry (processing, preserving,
canning, etc.), the light industries (textiles, woolens) and
the consumer and household goods industry. The mining indus-
try, which currently mines coal for internal consumption and
gold, tungsten concentrate and flourite for export to the
Soviet Union, is projected to increase its capability and
begin exploitation of other known mineral deposits which
53include lead, zinc, molybdenum, oil and uranium.
2 . International Security Relations
While economic improvement is a continuing goal,
Mongolia's most important concern is its poor relations with
China, and the security-related assistance received from the
Soviet Union.
In August 1978, while denouncing the PRC- Japan Peace
Treaty, Mongolia's head of state, Y. Tsedenbal stated:
The MPR itself is experiencing the conse-
quences of the great power chauvinist course
of the Peking leadership. The issue involves
a real threat to the independent existence of
a sovereign Mongolian state. The threat comes
from China, whose leaders do not hide their
intention to forcibly annex Mongolia.
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With justifiable indignation the Mongolian
public sees in the Peking leaders' hostile
anti-Vietnamese acts a copy of the impudent
acts pursued by the Maoists against inde-
pendent and sovereign socialist Mongolia.
From stopping economic aid to concentrating
troops on our border-all forms of pressure
are used by the Chinese authorities in an
attempt to impose their will on the freedom-
loving Mongolian people. 54
Mongolia and Soviet relations began before the estab-
lishment of the Soviet Union. Before the end of the Tsarist
rule, one of the last imperial treaties (The Tripartite Treaty
of June 5, 1915) was signed at Kyakhta, between Russia,
China and Outer Mongolia. This treaty, dealing with the
autonomous status of Outer Mongolia, was one of the first
questions that the new Communist regime in Russia had to
address. During the First World War China took advantage of
Russia's European problems to gain control and dominate
Mongolia until February 1921, when the Russians again
assumed the dominating role.
The independence of Mongolia was declared on July 10,
1921, after being an autonomous region with Russian support
since 1911. This declaration was followed by mutual recogni-
tion and a treaty of friendship with Soviet Union on November
5, 1921. During the next three years, the government structure
was patterned after the Soviet Union, and was formalized on
November 26, 1924 with the proclamation of the Mongolian
People's Republic.
For the next two decades, Mongolia remained under close
Soviet influence, without Chinese recognition. On March 12,
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1936, the Soviet Union and Mongolia signed a Protocol Treaty
on Mutual Assistance calling for various kinds of aid and
armed assistance in case of threat of attack and a guarantee
5 7
of the defense of Mongolia's independence. This protocol
permitted Soviet forces to be stationed in Mongolia. This
Soviet military assistance was instrumental in the defeat of
the Japanese army when it launched an attack on Mongolian
5 8
outposts and border positions at Nomonkhan on May 11, 1939.
The treaty also provided the Soviet Union with "a valuable
base for operations in Manchuria, and half the Soviet force
that participated in the lightning campaign against Japan
from August 8 through 20, 1945 went into Manchuria and Inner
59Mongolia from bases in Mongolia. The country also serves
as the choke point to isolate western China from Eastern
China at the Kansu Corridor.
The Protocol of 1936 expired and was replaced by a
Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance on February 27,
1946. The provisions of the new treaty were similar to those
of the Protocol, thus continuing the close defense ties with
the Soviet Union that Mongolia has felt it has needed during
60its existance.
Since gaining its independence, Mongolia has feared
that the Chinese would attempt to bring Mongolia back under
Chinese control. During the 1930 's and the 1940 ' s, Mongolia
relied solely on the USSR for economic and military aid.
In January, 1946, the Kuomintang government of China
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recognized the independence of Mongolia, but never exchanged
ambassadors. On October 6, 1949, the People's Republic of
China recognized Mongolia with a Chinese ambassador arriving
in Ulan Bator in July, 1950. 61
The signing of a Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation
and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and China, on February
14, 1950, brought about a decade of peaceful competition
which benefited Mongolia. The Chinese began offering tech-
nical assistance and manpower for Mongolia's modernization
process. Loans, in sums of 160 million rubles, then 100
million and 200 million rubles were given by the Chinese,
which were followed by, respectively, loans of 300 million
rubles and 615 million rubles from the USSR.
In 1962 was the highpoint in Chinese cooperation with
Mongolia. Between 1955 and 1952 China was the second largest
source of aid to Mongolia, behind the USSR. By 1960, 18 per
cent of Mongolian exports were going to China, only ten years
before Mongolian exports went solely to the USSR. On
December 26, 1962, Mongolia and China signed a border agree-
64
ment that was favorable to Mongolia.
The breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations in the early
1960 's, and the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict in
modern Asia, was closely followed by a breakdown of Sino-
Mongolian relations and a return of the old Mongolian
attitude towards China, the Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of
Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance of January 15,
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1966, and a return to Mongolian total reliance upon Soviet
economic and military aid.
The Soviet interest in Mongolia is both strategic
and economic. Historically, the Soviet Union has viewed
the MPR as a buffer zone to be maintained between Soviet
Central Asia and China. In February, 1945, at the Yalta
conference, one of the terms agreed upon for Soviet entry
into the war against Japan was the preservation of the status
quo in Outer Mongolia. This status quo was independence
and freedom from Chinese aggression.
The purpose of Mongolia as a buffer zone is to keep
the Chinese as far as possible from the strategic vulnerable
railroad system between Chita and the tip of Lake Baikal.
A more significant strategic consideration develops when
considering the future of central Asia, specifically the
Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (hereafter Sinkiang)
.
Sinkiang is a Chinese province that is wealthy in
mineral resources, notably iron, coal and oil. In the
vicinity of Urumchi, China has developed iron mills and
coal mines and oil refineries near Kolamai , Wusu and
Tushantzu. In the Tarim Basin, at the Sinkiang and Kansu
province border, China has discovered oil fields and
erected refineries near Yumensien and Yumen.
The importance of Sinkiang's position has also been
recognized by non-Soviets as well as Soviets. In September
1948, Doak Barnett underlined the strategic importance of
Peitashan which "dominates the entire Sinkiang-Outer Mongolia
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border, from a strategic point of view.... It flanks the
Sinkiang supply line from Kansu; in non-Chinese hands, it
could be a stronghold capable of severing Sinkiang from
(\ 7
the rest of China." In August, 1964, Mao Tse-tung
expressed concern over possible Soviet ambitions concerning
Sinkiang
:
The Russians took everything they could.
Some people have declared that the
Sinkiang area... must be included in the
Soviet Union. 68
Another major Soviet interest in Mongolia is the
necessity of keeping China off-balance. This interest can
be accomplished in a twofold manner. The first is the actual
presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia, which have numbered an
69
estimated three divisions since 1966. The presence of
these troops would be to divert Chinese troops from the Sino-
Soviet border. The other method of keeping China off-balance
is by means of propaganda. The primary use of propaganda
against China, in the context of Mongolia, is in attempts to
undermine China's position and relations with Third World
nations. The ability of the Soviet Union to realize these
interests is partially the result of the freedom of action
that the Soviet-Mongolian TOFCMA will permit.
3 . Treaty Effects
It is possible to identify two major effects of the
implementation of the Soviet-Mongolian TOFCMA. The Soviet
Union is the major trade partner with and economically





The Mongolian trade balance has been an increasing
deficit, with no change in its trend.
The other major effect of the Soviet-Mongolian
treaty was to legitimize the military assistance and the
presence of Soviet forces in Mongolia. The treaty (Article 5)
calls on both parties to "assist each other in ensuring the
defensive capacity ... and in steadily strengthening the de-
70fensive power of the socialist community." To this end
the Soviet Union support of the Mongolian armed forces was
recognized by Mongolian Defense Minister General Dor j
:
Thanks to the openhearted and compre-
hensive assistance of our loyal friend
and the reliable bulwark of peace--the
great Soviet Union and its valorous armed
forces, the Mongolian People's Army
possesses modern weapons and combat equip-
ment and highly trained military cadres
and has become a modern army capable to-
gether with its allies of reliably defend-
ing its socialist motherland against the
intrigues of aggressive forces. 71
Article 5 of the treaty also calls for action con-
sisting of "all necessary measures, including military
72
measures," to defend each of the contracting parties.
It is because of the Mongolian fear of Chinese invasion
that the Soviet Union is able to station Soviet armed
forces in Mongolia.
The presence of Soviet military units in
Mongolia at the present time is a result
of the Chinese authorities' policies
toward the Mongolian People's Republic.
Ruling circules in the PRC have on more
than on occasion openly stated their in-
tention has been accompanied by practical
actions which eventually brought about
the present tense situation in the mutual




Vietnam is the last of the four Asian nations with
a TOFCMA to be examined. Because of the lack of reliable
empirical data, due to the unrest that has occurred in
Southeast Asia over the last twenty years, the analysis
must be performed on insufficient data.
1 . Problem Areas
In February 1974, before the Fourth Session of the
National Assembly, Vice-Premier Le Thanh Nghi prioritized
Vietnam's problems:
(1) heal the wounds of war
(2) restore and develop the economy and
culture of the country
(3) build the socialist material and
technical base for production
(4) consolidate the socialist relations
of production
(5) consolidate the socialist regime
(6) stabilize the people's livelihood
(7) consolidate national defense
(8) strive to fulfill the North's duty
to the south. 7 4
In April, 1974, First Secretary Le Duan expanded on the major
problems that confronted Vietnam:
Our economy was shattered by the war.
Weak and lopsided, it now has to meet
the increasingly numerous and extensive
requirements of post-war reconstruction;
besides, we have shortcomings in leader-
ship, direction and management; all this
is the cause of the imbalance and funda-
mental weakness of our economy ... .Our
agricultural production is uncertain and
unequal in different regions; it falls
short of satisfying the needs of the
population, industry, agriculture and
exports in food and raw materials. >
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The economic problems of Vietnma have not been
solved. The necessity of "building the material and tech-
nical base for socialism and gradually to improve the living
7 f\
standards of the working people" depends on agriculture.
With eighty-five per cent of its labor force engaged in the
agricultural industry, Vietnam has acutely felt the failure
to meet modernization and industrialization goals because of
the severe agricultural problems within the country which
include natural disasters (drought, floods, pests, etc.),
77poor management and lack of incentives. The diversion of
resources to food and fertilizer, and the shortage of raw
materials, has resulted in a very slow growth rate of
industry.
Vietnam's economic improvement is heavily dependent
upon foreign aid because of its limited ability to import
technology, grain and other commodities resulting from
7 8
extremely low foreign exchange reserves. This aid pre-
viously came from the Soviet Union, including cancelling
of all debts before August 1975, promised project aid and
hard currency totalling $5 million annually between 1976
and 1930, foodstuffs to avert famine, and Soviet financed
79
oil from the Middle East, and China, primarily in loans
80
of $300 million annually until 1978. Chinese aid was
8
1
terminated in June 1978, and in the same month, June 28,
Vietnam joined the Communist Council for Mutual Economic
8 2




Vietnam's economic problems vie for contention,
within the government, with another major problem, that of
Vietnam's relations with the Asian neighbors. The flight
of the refugees from Vietnam over the past two years has
strained its relations with its neighbors, particularly
Malaysia and Indonesia. In peninsular Southeast Asia,
the centuries-old territorial claims and animosities
between the Vietnamese and Khmer peoples, and the competi-
tion for influence between Vietnam and China, has resulted
in open warfare in Cambodia and threatens the peace and
security of Thailand.
A major concern in Vietnam's Asian relations is
its confrontation with China. Relations between Vietnam
and China deteriorated after the Vietnam War. In October
1975, in Peking Le Duan refused to sign a joint communique
that contained an anti-hegemony clause. Soon after this
incident, the Chinese ended all grant assistance and stated
they would not permit Vietnam to occupy the Spratly Islands,
84
which are claimed by both nations.
Tension between Vietnam and China continued to
increase into 1978. In the July 21, 1978, Peking Review ,
China declared:
...the Soviet superpower with its own
hegemonistic aims provides cover and
support for the Vietnamese authorities'
regional hegemonism, while the Vietnamese
authorities serve as a junior partner for
the Soviet Union. ^5
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China also declared later that the Soviet Union was "striving
.,,87
to turn Vietnam into another Cuba," and began to refer to
the Vietnamese as "a willing power of Soviet social-imperalism'
8 8
and "the Cuba of Asia." The Chinese attacked Soviet-
Vietnamese treaty of friendship and co-operation as "...the
89
'Holy Alliance' of the global and regional hegemonists"
and that the Soviet treaty was actually a military pact
"designated to draw these countries into its drive for world
u „90hegemony ."
The climax of Sino-Vietnamese tensions occurred on
February 19, 1979 when the Chinese began a seventeen day
invasion campaign against Vietnam, to force the Vietnamese
91
to relax their Kampuchean operations. Tensions remain high
between Vietnam and China over their border region, the
Cambodia invasion and because of Soviet influence and presence
in Vietnam.
2 . International Security Relations
During the first twenty years of its existence, the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam maintained a careful stance
between the Soviet Union and China, playing one against the
other. It was not until 1975-76 that Vietnam began to move
into a pro-Soviet stance.
In the 1950 's Soviet aid totaled approximately half
the amount that Vietnam received from China. By 1963, both
the Soviet Union and China were providing approximately
$330 million each per year. As can be seen in Table V,
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by 1972 the Soviets provided more than twice the aid that
was provided by the Chinese.
TABLE V
USSR AND PRC AID TO VIETNAM92
With the movement of Vietnam into the Soviet camp,
the Soviet Union increased its economic, military and
diplomatic aid. Economically, the Soviet Union has provided
more than five hundred million dollars in annual assistance
since the end of the Vietnam war, as well as providing
93technology and advisors.
Soviet exports to Vietnam are designed to assist
the modernization process, and include petroleum products,
metals, electrical and mechanical machinery, vehicles, etc.
Vietnam exports labor intensive products such as valuable
woods, rice, and handicrafts. Recently the Vietnamese have
begun exporting pharmaceutical products, indicating some
success of utilizing imported technology from the Soviet
94Union.
Militarily the Soviet Union has continued to fulfill




In case either party is attacked or
threatened with attack, the two parties
signatory to the treaty shall immediately
consult each other with a view to elimi-
nating that threat, and shall take appro-
priate and effective measures to safeguard „-
peace and the security of the two countries.
The Soviets have provided arms, assistance, training, planning
and advisors to the Vietnamese armed forces. (See Appendix D.)
In the first six months of 1979, the Soviet Union is estimated
to have delivered approximately ninety thousand tons of
material to Vietnam. Soviet support during the Chinese in-
vasion was also indicated by the arrival of a fourteen vessel
96task force in the Vietnamese waters.
Diplomatically, the Soviet Union and Vietnam have
supported each other. In 1974, the Soviets supported Vietnam
97in its dispute with China over the Paracel Islands. The
Soviet Union voiced support for Vietnam during its invasion
of Cambodia during 1978 and the Chinese invastion of Vietnam
98in 19791. Vietnam's support continues in the political
realm with its latest support of Soviet actions in Afghanistan.
Soviet-Vietnamese relations have grown into a solid
partnership of fraternal support. The Soviet Union needs
the strategic position of Vietnam and Vietnam needs the economic
and military assistance of the Soviet Union.
3. Treaty Effects
The effects of the Soviet-Vietnamese TOFCMA, signed on
November 3, 1978, are prominently visible only in the military




which economic and diplomatic relations revolve, there has
not been any marked changes in these relations.
With regard to military assistance and presence,
Vietnam's Army Chief of Staff, General Van Tien Dung stated
that "the Vietnam-USSR treaty of friendship and cooperation
has been developing its effect." Soviet Vice-Foreign
Minister Nikolai Firyubin called the visit of Soviet warships
to Vietnamese ports as "a duty of the Soviet-Vietnamese
treaty." Both statements refer to Article 6 of the treaty
that calls on consultations and appropriate measures to
eliminate a threat to the security and peace of the two
parties
.
Another aspect of military trends that has been
affected by the signing of the Vietnamese-Soviet TOFCMA is
arms transfers. It is not possible to define a change in
the trend of monetary expenditures for arms, but there is
a definite change of quality of arms received from the Soviet
Union after the treaty was signed.
Seven days after the treaty was signed, Vietnam
received its first ever delivery of Mig-23's. In 1979, Vietnam
received additional Mig-23's, and a first ever delivery of
Mi-24 armored helicopter gunships . In 1979, the Soviet
Union also offered the Vietnamese ten naval vessels, including
"F" class submarines, to bolster their navy. These arms
transfers and offers are of a markedly better quality than





A. SOVIET BENEFITS FROM TOFCMA'S
The material and data presented thus far has demon-
strated the importance of treaties to the Soviet system of
international law, the Soviet interpretations of the Asian
TOFCMA's, the predictability of the Asian TOFCMA's and the
Soviet utilization of these treaties in Asia. The benefits
accrued by the Soviet Union by utilizing these treaties
can be detailed through discussion of four general areas
of Soviet interest in Asia: an Asian collective security
system; Asian balance of power; strategic positions; Soviet
prestige.
1 . Asian Collective Security System
The draft of the Indo-Soviet treaty had lain
for two years in a drawer in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. After
the announcement of Nixon's visit to China,
the Soviet Union hastily concluded this treaty
with India. Its aim is to realize Brezhnev's
'Asian Collective Security System, " which is
directed against the countries to which Russia
is hostile. But this aim is probably diffi-
cult to realize.
1
The accuracy of Chou En-lai's statement has been
proven since Brezhnev proposed the Asian Security
Collective System to an International Meeting of Communist
and Workers Party on June 7, 1969. This proposal, as
Brezhnev discussed in March 1972, included the principles
of renunciation of the use of force between states,
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respect for the sovereignty and existing borders of states,
non-interference in internal affairs, and cooperation in
economic and other fields. Details of the plan, as outlined
by IZVESTIA, described the plan as a defensive measure to
safeguard the independence of Asian countries against
"imperialist aggression and neo-colonialism." Further
details of the plan were revealed to Pakistan's Yahya Khan
by the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan in the summer of 1969,
which included such actions as:
a. parties would not enter into any alliance with
a third country that might be hostile to any member countries;
b. parties would not make commitments inconsistent
with the security plan;
c. parties will consult each other in case of
aggression by a third party.
Brezhnev's proposal was not well received by most
of the Asian nations. China, when denouncing the proposal,
charged that the plan was picked up from the "garbage heap
4
of the notorous warmonger John Foster Dulles." India
desired to maintain its purported non-aligned status by
avoiding military alliances. The Foreign Ministry of
Afghanistan stated:
Afghanistan has never had and will not wish
to have desire of joining any military and
defensive pact under whatever name it may
be formed.
5
With the failure of the collective security proposal,
the Soviet Union sought a new device to cloak the construction
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of such system. It fell upon the Asian TOFCMA system to
fill this need. It is important to note that all of the
principles and details of the security system previously
cited are included in the treaties examined (see Appendix B)
,
except for the Mongolian treaty which predated the collective
security proposal
.
Of special interest is Afghanistan's change of
position with regard to an Asian collective system. The
Soviet-Afghan treaty is the only Asian TOFCMA that specific-
ally calls for "the creation of an effective security system
in Asia on the basis of joint efforts by all countries of
the continent" (Article 8) , while Indian and Vietnamese
TOFCMA's do not mention any security system.
2 . Asian Balance of Power
The second area of Soviet interest in Asia is the
Asian balance of power. The primary objective of this
Soviet interest is the countering of perceived Chinese
aspirations. In the diplomatic realm, this includes pro-
viding verbal support to its treaty partners during their
confrontations with China. This support accounts for the
continuous propaganda that accuses China of desires to
annex Mongolia. The Soviets supported India over the
Kashmir issue and during the Balgladesh crisis while China
supported Pakistan. The Soviet Union denounced the Chinese
invasion of Vietnam during February, 1979.
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A geographic effort by the Soviet Union against
China is that country's objective to contain and encompass
China with pro-Soviet nations. The Soviet Union is
building a wall of such governments with the Asian TOFCMA's,
and is nearly complete to the west of China with the South
Asian TOFCMA's with Afghanistan and India.
Further Soviet desires in the balance of power game
is the reduction of Chinese influence. The Asian TOFCMA's
do not signify the beginning of an effort to reduce Chinese
influence, but are the culmination of Soviet efforts along
this line. As in the case of India, such efforts will
probably not keep Chinese influence out of a country, but
will probably keep such influence that may arise from
becoming important or usable against the Soviet Union.
The final efforts of the Soviet Union to alter the
Asian balance of power in its favor is by building up the
Asian TOFCMA signatories' military forces and capabilities.
The signing of an Asian TOFCMA generally climaxes a series
of massive arms sales by the Soviet Union. This trade
builds some control over the military budget of the other
nations. After a treaty is signed, arms transfers continue
to arrive from the Soviet Union, but in smaller quantities
in terms of money spent.
The significant change in arms transfers between
the Soviet Union and the Asian signatories of the TOFCMA's
is the superior quality of the arms received after a treaty
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is signed. This superior quality is marked by the intro-
duction of a newer, more capable model of armament pre-
viously received, or the introduction of armament never
previously received. Afghanistan received the Mig-21MF
fighter, the Mi-24 armored helicopter gunship and the PT-76
tank. India received Mig-23 fighters, 11-38 ASW aircraft,
SSN-2/9/11 missiles, missile ships, and licensed production
rights for the Mig-21MF. Vietnam received Mig-23 fighters
7
and the Mi-24 helicopter gunship.
The Soviet Union supports all the Asian signatories
with military aid, assistance, advisors, and training and
support. Military advisors were in Vietnam for several
weeks prior to the launching of the Cambodian offensive.
Mongolia utilizes its TOFCMA (Article 5) to ensure the
presence of Soviet forces to deter possible Chinese
aggression. All four nations utilize the treaty to justify
the support received from the Soviet Union, whether material,
actual troops, or the presence of Soviet forces in a non-
beligerent status, as with Soviet naval port visits to
Q
India and Vietnam.
3 . Strategic Positions
The Soviet Union also desires to obtain and maintain
close relations with those nations that occupy a strategic
military position. One aspect of strategic positioning is
the possibility of acting as a buffer state for the Soviet
Union's security system. Mongolia and Afghanistan have
historically performed this task, with Afghanistan only
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recently becoming the near equivalent of a Soviet satellite
nation.
With regard to strategic world locations, the
Asian partners of the TOFCMA system all occupy priority
areas. Afghanistan is next to Iran and within easy flying
distance to the Persian Gulf. India can control major
shipping lanes throughout the Indian Ocean, offers refuel-
ing and repair facilities for Soviet aircraft and is
directly beneath China. Mongolia forms a major portion of
the northern border of China. Vietnam is on China's south-
east border, and has excellent maritime facilities that
can be utilized by the Soviet navy. Vietnam occupies a
position on the major trade routes of China and Japan with
the rest of the world, and offers an excellent observation
position over that entire region of the world.
4 . Soviet Prestige
The last major area of interest that the Soviets
hope to enhance with the Asian TOFCMA' s is Soviet prestige
and influence in Asia, and the world. This enhancement is
attempted primarily through economic aid and assistance.
Soviet aid and assistance tends to generally be
showcase aid. The Soviets help the signatory nations
build factories, power plants, transportation facilities,
and mining and processing plants that are high visible.
While these projects assist the modernization processes
of the Asian TOFCMA signatories, they are also projects
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that the Soviets can point to when they desire to impress
9
other Asian states.
Another aspect of Soviet aid that should be noted
is the quickness of Soviet response. When an aid agree-
ment is signed, the Soviet Union will begin to fulfill
that agreement when the other nation is ready. Also, when
a disaster occurs, the Soviet Union responds quickly with
requested aid to its Asian TOFCMA partners.
B. SUMMATION
The Asian TOFCMA' s that have been examined provide the
Soviet Union with important aspects of its foreign policy.
The examination of data and trends in this thesis has high-
lighted the effects of a TOFCMA on relations between the
Soviet Union and the four Asian countries examined. These
trends and effects indicated that these treaties do provide
the Soviet Union with a valuable asset for the conduct of
its relations in Asia.
For the discussions presented above, a study of other
Asian nations, and examination of the trends that corre-
spond to those identified, it is possible to theorize the
extent to which the Soviet Union could expand its system
of Treaties of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance
In terms of the TOFCMA system, the following might or might




The present TOFCMA is the only treaty that has a
clause permitting early termination of the treaty. When
the current crisis subsides, the new Afghan government
will look to the Soviet Union for massive support. This
support will provide leverage for the Soviets to have the
present treaty cancelled and a new treaty of socialist
orientation (more binding) signed. This event could occur
within the next two years
.
2. Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a prime candidate for a non-socialist
treaty, similar to India's.
3. Bhutan





Burma fits the flow diagram to obtain a treaty,
possibly socialist oriented.
5. Cambodia
If the current situation resolves itself into a
stable pro-Soviet government, a socialist oriented treaty
is likely to be concluded.
6. China
No treaty. The 1950 TOFCMA was cancelled by China
















A socialist oriented treaty similar to Vietnam's
could be concluded within the next two years.
13. Malaysia
No treaty in the immediate future, but there exists
the possibility of a non-socialist oriented treaty if
Soviet-Malaysian relations continue to improve.
14. Mongolia
The present treaty will remain in effect until the
mid-1980's when it will probably be replaced with a newer
version of a socialist oriented treaty, similar to Vietnam's
15. Nepal








A non-socialist oriented treaty is possible within





Present treaty will remain in effect.
The dynamic potentialities of the Soviet Asian TOFCMA
system are reaily apparent when reviewing the various Asian
nations that could be included with a TOFCMA. Bangladesh
could provide maritime facilities and an opportunity to
lessen Chinese influence in the South Asian region. Burma
and Laos could become additional blocks in the wall to
contain China as well as being areas to counter Chinese
influence. Malaysia is strategically located on choke
points of major shipping lanes between the Indian and
Pacific Oceans. Sri Lanka is strategically located to
permit complete naval and air coverage of the Indian Ocean
and countering the influence of the Chinese. North Korea
provides the Soviet Union with a nation to buffer the
Soviet Union from China. The Soviet-Korean TOFCMA was not
discussed in this thesis as it is essentially a mutual
defense arrangement similar to the Soviet-Mongolian TOFCMA
which it predates.
These Asian TOFCMA' s encompass the Soviets' Asian
collective security desires without being a military alliance.
The treaties legitimize the Soviet's assistance and presence
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in support of the armed forces of the Asian signatories.
These treaties are part of a Soviet system to exhibit and
demonstrate Soviet prestige and "willingness" to befriend
third world nations
.
The flexibility of the Asian TOFCMA system permits the
Soviet Union to choose the options of actions that fit the
needs of the Soviet Union, while at the same time offering
inducements to its present and future TOFCMA partners to
ensure their cooperation with the Soviet Union. The vagueness
of the clauses of the individual treaties permits the Soviet
Union and the other signatory to interpret the TOFCMA and
take actions that are in their own best interests.
The Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assis-
tance in Asia is an advantageous tool for the foreign policy
decision-makers of the Soviet Union. It gives them the
capability and flexibility needed to pursue the Soviet
Union's aims and desires in Asia. It legalizes and legiti-
mizes many Soviet actions with its treaty partners. This
legalization of the Soviet actions poses problems for U.S.
foreign policy decision-makers, and thus makes it necessary
to understand and correctly interpret the content, context
and intention of each Asian Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation











Support for Independence and 7,
National Sovereignty
National Resource Sovereignty 8,
Defend Socialist Gains 9,
Exchange of Opinion 10,
Broaden Mutual Acquaintenance 11.
of Life, Work, etc.
Peace-Loving Foreign Policy 12,
Peaceful Co-Existence 13.
World Peace and Security 14.
One-Mindedness 15
Mutual Defense 16







In the interest of the Soviet Union.
U.S.S.R. assists other states and brings
them closer to the Soviet camp.
States do not attack nor permit attacks
nor form alliances against the U.S.S.R.
Fight against imperialism and capitalist
enslavers
.
Conduct of a string capitalist state.
States should have free will and support
the U.S.S.R.
States control own resources and give
U.S.S.R. priority access to them.
All parties ensure socialist/communist
government and social systems remain
pro-Soviet
.
U.S.S.R. insures all states support U.S.S.R.
and its desires.
U.S.S.R. attempts to brings about socialism/
communism.
Use of peaceful means to support U.S.S.R.
policy outside own state, utilizing force
when peaceful actions do not obtain desired
result
.
Peace policy, absence of violent struggle
while preparing for advance of communism.
Soviet peace and security, non-military
phase oi" protracted conflict.
Following Soviet policies.
U.S.S.R. can give military aid and enter
country with military personnel and equipment
States use Soviet military equipment and
become dependent on Soviet military supplies.
Divert attention from security problems 2nd
weaken hostile military forces.
U.S.S.R. provide assistance, funds, and
materia] (if necessary) to improve other
states' economic and social standards; other
states provide U.S.S.R. items needed and any










































Support for Nations Seeking Sovereignty
and Independence





























Mutual Assistance If Threatened/Attacked













Not Permit Territory For Military Aggression
No Alliance Against Other Party
No Action Against Other Party
No Conflict With Other Treaties










Exchange Opinions on International Affairs
Questions Concerning This Treaty Mutually
Discussed
Defend Socialist Gains












































































Numerals - Article Number
•Afghanistan: 20 years
India: 2(1 years
Mongol La : 20 yea rs
Vietnam: 25 years
; *A11 extens ions automatic for




Mongo 1 in : 1 years
Vietnam: 10 years
the period











































































































































469.9 (12) 192.2 (10)



















































































































































= Exports to USSR
Imports from USSR
= Trade Balance with USSR
= Aid/Credit/Loans Received During Year (not including military)
from USSR
a Percentage of V.'orld Trade
= Not Available
= Data not available to determine percentage of world trade.
Estimates place USSR/Mongolian trade at 853-90* of Mongolia's
total trade.
Afghanistan was recipient of Soviet aid throughout the period
covered, but this aid is difficult to quantify although it was
estimated to be at $1.5 billion by 1975.
India has received aid totaling over $1 1/4 billion through 1975
India continues to receive aid and assistance to the present.
Mongolia receives steady aid, assistance and grants from USSR
yearly, but actual figures are not available.
The figures for Vietnam are estimates on aid with a $1.5 billion
agreement for the next five years.
Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics for Years 1908-1970.
New York: Statistical Office oi' the United Nations.
Notes- figures are fro pi the yearbook, except for percentages (which are

















1963 8.4 38.9 T-54, 11-14
1964 12.9 46.5 42.3 T-54, Mig-19
1965 14.4 44.4 48.7 Mig-19, Mi -4
1966 14.8 43.3 40.7 Mig-21
1967 15.9 37.3 32.9 SA-2, Mig-21
1968 34.0 31.4 51.5 Mig-21
1969 34.0 34 48.3
1970 29.3 30 34.8 Mig-21
1971 26.1 29 22.2 Mi -8
1972 30.9 29 21.4 SU-7
1973 33.2 39 79.9 Helos, APC
1974 30.1 38 82.3 Helos , Tanks
1975 38.0 45 41.9
1976 36.4 60 39.6
1977 42.7 53 45.1
1978 na na na Mig-21MF
1979 na na na Mi-9/24, PT-76
NOTE: During the period covered, the USSR supplied approximately
















1963 1772.4 2055 272.4 Mig-21
1964 1797.0 2011 180.4 PT-76
1965 1813.8 1961 189.5 SA-2, PT-76, Mi-4,
Mig-21
1966 1639.8 1852 376.8 LST, AN-12, SA-2,
Mig-21
1967 1610.2 1718 132.7 Mig-21, TU-124
1968 1610.7 1788 219.2 F SUB, T-55, SU-7B
1969 1649.5 1892 170.2 T-55, SU-7B, F SUB
Frigates
1970 1748.4 1949 115.6 T-55, SU-7B, F SUB
1971 2110.9 2320 264.4 T-55, SU-7B, Mi-8
SSN-2
1972 2054.7 2449 221.6 SSN-2, Mig-21M/MF,
Frigates
1973 1765.1 2165 170.2 F SUB, Mig-21M
1974 1874.3 2014 173.3 YAK-36, Mig-.21M,
LST, F SUB, SSN-9
1975 2286.6 2266 141.7 F SUB, NANUCHKA,
OSA, SA-6, 11-38,
Mig-21M
1976 2269.2 2660 245.4 SSN-11, SSN-2,
KASHIN, F SUB,
KA-25, Mig-21Bis
1977 2311.2 2584 345.1 SSN-11, 11-38,
Mig-21M
1978 na 2864 na SSN-11, Mig-21M
1979 na na na Mig-21M
NOTE: 1. Arms trade supplied by USSR: 1963-1973: 591
1973-1977: 85.1%
2. India has contracted for Mig-23 (possible 50),
probably in 1974.


















































































1. All figures are estimates.
2. All arms trade is with USSR.
3. Mongolia's military forces are equipped and
heavily supported by the Soviet army.
4. Known armament in Mongolian forces includes
T-54 tanks, PT-76 tanks, Mig-15's. It is
likely that more modern equipment has been





































1966 447.1 640 616.8 PT-76, Mig-15/17/21,
Gunboat





1969 361.5 585 389.4 SA-2, Mig-17/21
1970 342.5- 585 321.1 SA-2, AN-2, T-54,
Mig-17/21
1971 327.7 585 341.1 SA-2, T-54,
Mig-17/21
1972 343.5 635 819.2 SSN-2, SA-2/7,
Gunboat, Komar,
T-54, Mig-17/21
1973 290.7 565 269.9
1974 na 565 201.0 Tanks
1975 na 605 108.4 SA-9
1976 na na 39.6 SSN-2, T-62, SA-7
1977 na na 7.1
1978 na na na Mi g - 2 3













Soviet arms to counter the Chinese invasion. The
USSR also offered ten na\al vessels, including "F"
class submarines to the Vietnamese navy.
APPENDIX D General Notes:
All figures arc US $-million at 1973 constant rates.
ACDA refers to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agencies
yearbooks entitled, "World Military Expenditures and Arms
Trans fers .
SIPRI refers to the Stockholm International Peace Research




SOVIET-AFGHAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP,
GOOD-NEIGHBORLINESS AND CO-OPERATION
(TREATY TEXT)
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan,
Reaffirming their commitment to the aims and principles of the
Soviet-Afghan treaties of 1921 and 1931, which laid the basis
for friendly and goodneighbour relations between the Soviet
and Afghan peoples and which meet their basic national interests.
Willing to strengthen in every way friendship and all-round
cooperation between the two countries.
Being determined to develop social and economic achievements
of the Soviet and Afghan peoples, to safeguard their security
and independence, to come out resolutely for the cohesion of
all the forces fighting the peace, national independence,
democracy and social progress.
Expressing their firm determination to facilitate the strengthen-
ing fruitful and mutually beneficial cooperation in Asia,
attaching great importance to the further consolidation of the
contractual-legal basis of their relations.
Reaffirming their dedication to the aims and principles of the
United Nations Charter.
Decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Good-
neighbourliness and Cooperation and agreed on the following:
Article 1
The high contracting parties solemnly declare their determina-
tion to strengthen and deepen the inviolable friendship between
the two countries and to develop all-round cooperation on the
basis of equality, respect for national sovereignty, territorial,
integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.
Article 2
The high contracting parties shall make efforts to strengthen
and broaden mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical
cooperation between them. With these aims in view, they shall
develop and deepen cooperation in the fields of industry, transport
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and communications, agriculture, the use of national resources,
development of the power-generating industry and other branches
of economy, to give each other assistance in the training of
national personnel and in planning the development of the
national economy. The two sides shall expand trade on the
basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and most-
favoured nation treatment.
Article 5
The high contracting parties shall promote the development of
cooperation and exchange of experience inthe fields of science,
culture, art, literature, education, health services, the press,
radio, television, cinema, tourism, sport, and other fields.
The two sides shall facilitate the expansion of cooperation
between organs of state power and public organizations, enter-
prises, cultural and scientific institutions with a view to
making a deeper acquaintance of the life, work experience and
achievements of the peoples of the two countries.
Article 4
The high contracting parties, acting in the spirit of the
traditions of friendship and goodneighbourliness , as well as
the U.N. Charter, shall consult each other and take by agree-
ment appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence,
and territorial integrity of the two countries.
In the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of the
high contracting parties they shall continue to develop co-
operation in the military field on the basis of appropriate
agreements concluded between them.>=>
Article 5
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy
of nonalignment which is pursued by the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan and which is an important factor for maintaining
international peace and security.
The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan respects the policy of
peace pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all
countries and peoples.
Article 6
Each of the high contracting parties solemnly declares that it
shall not join any military or other alliances or take part in
any groupings of states, as well as in actions or measured




The high contracting parties shall continue to make every
effort to defend international peace and the security of the
peoples, to deepen the process of relaxation of international
tension, to spread it to all areas of the world, including
Asia, to translate it into concrete forms of mutually bene-
ficial cooperation among states and to settle international
disputed issues by peaceful means.
The two sides shall actively contribute toward general and
complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under
effective international control.
Article 8
The high contracting parties shall facilitate the development
of cooperation among Asian states and the establishment of
relations of peace, goodneighbourliness and mutual confidence
among them and the creation of an effective security system
in Asia on the basis of joint efforts by all countries of the
continent.
Article 9
The high contracting parties shall continue their consistent
struggle against machinations by the forces of aggression,
for the final elimination of colonialism and racism in all
their forms and manifestations.
The two sides shall cooperate with each other and with other
peaceloving states in supporting the just struggle of the
peoples for their freedom, independence, sovereignty and
social progress.
Article 10
The high contracting parties shall consult with each other on




The high contracting parties state that their commitments under
the existing international treaties do not contradict the pro-
visions of the present treaty and undertake not to conclude any




Questions which may arise between the high contracting parties
concerning the interpretation or application of any provision
of the present treaty, shall be settled bilaterally, in the
spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and respect.
ARTICLE 13
The present treaty shall remain in force within twenty years
of the date it becomes effective. Unless one of the high
contracting parties declares six months before the expiration
of this term of its desire to terminate the treaty, it shall
remain in force for the next five years until one of the high
contracting parties warns in writing the other party, six
months before the expiration of current five-year term, about
its intention to terminate the treaty.
ARTICLE 14
If one of the high contracting parties expresses the wish in
the course of the twenty-year term of the treaty to terminate
it before its expiration date, it shall notify in writing the
other party, six months before its suggested date of expira-
tion of the treaty, about its desire to terminate the treaty
before the expiration of the term and may consider the treaty
terminated as of the date thus set.
ARTICLE 15
The present treaty shall be ratified and take effect on the
day of exchange of the instruments of ratification, which is
to take place in Kabul.
Done in duplicate, each in the Russian and Dari languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
Done in Moscow on December 5, 1978.
For the Union of Soviet For the Democratic
Socialist Republic Republic of Afghanistan
L. Brezhnev. N« Mohammad Taraki
.
Source: Foreign Broadcast Information Services: USSR,





OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION
Wishing to expand and strengthen the existing relations
of sincere friendship between them,
considering that the further development of friendship
and cooperation meets the basic national interests of both
states as well as the interests of a lasting peace in Asia
and throughout the world,
being determined to contribute to strengthening world
peace and security and to work tirelessly to bring about a
relaxation of international tension and the final abolition
of the remnants of colonialism.
reaffirming their firm belief in the principles of peaceful
coexistence and cooperation between states with different
political and social systems,
convinced that in the present-day world international
problems can be solved only through cooperation and not
through conflict,
reaffirming their determination to follow the objectives
and principles of the United National Charter.
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the one hand,
and the Republic of India, on the other, have decided to
conclude the present Treaty and with this aim in view have
appointed the following plenipotentiaries:
on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - -the
Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R. A. A. Gromyko
,
on behalf of the Republic of India--the Minister of External
Affairs of India Swaran Singh,
who, upon presentation of their credentials, found in due
form and proper order, agreed on the following:
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that there
shall be a lasting peace and friendship between their two
countries and their peoples. Each shall respect the inde-
pendence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other
and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the
other Party. The High Contracting Parties shall continue to
develop and strengthen the relations of sincere friendship,
good-neighbourliness and all-round cooperation existing
between them, on the basis of the above-mentioned principles




Guided by a desire to contribute in every. way towards
ensuring a lasting peace and the security of their peoples,
the High Contracting Parties declare their determination to
continue efforts towards maintaining and strengthening peace
in Asia and throughout the world, ending the arms race and
achieving general and complete disarmament covering both




Guided by their devotion to the lofty ideal of equality
of all peoples and states, irrespective of race or creed,
the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racism
in all forms and manifestations and reaffirm their deter-
mination to strive for their final and complete abolition.
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with other
states in achieving these aims and to support the just
aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colo-
nialism and racial domination.
Article 4
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's
policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy is
an important factor for maintaining universal peace and
international security and for easing tension in the world.
The Republic of India respects the peaceful policy of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening
friendship and cooperation with all peoples.
Article 5
Being deeply interested in ensuring world peace and
security, and attaching great importance to mutual coopera-
tion in the international arena to achieve these aims, the
High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts
with each other on major international problems affecting
the interests of both states, through meetings and exchanges
of opinion between their leading statesmen, visits by
official delegations and special representatives of the




Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and
technical cooperation between them, the High Contracting
Parties shall continue to strengthen and widen their
mutually advantageous and all-round cooperation in these
fields and also to expand their cooperation in the fields
of trade, transport and communications on the basis of the
principles of equality, mutual advantage and the most
favoured nation principle in compliance with the existing
agreements and special agreements with neighbouring countries,
as it is stipulated in the trade agreement between the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and India of December 26,
1970.
Article 7
The High Contracting Parties shall promote the further
development of the relations and contacts between them in
the fields of science, art, literature, education, health




In accordance with the traditional friendship established
between the two countries, each of the High Contracting
Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or
participate in any military alliances directed against the
other Party.
Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain
from any aggression against the other party and not to allow
the use of its territory for committing any act that may
cause military damage to the other High Contracting Party.
Article 9
Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain
from giving any assistance to any third Party taking part in
an armed conflict with the other Party. In the event that
any of the Parties is attacked or threatened with attack, the
High Contracting Parties will immediately start mutual con-
sultations with a view to eliminating this threat and taking
appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security
for their countries.
Article 10
Each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares
that it shall not undertake any commitments, secret or open,
with regard to one or more states incompatible with the
present Treaty. Each of the High Contracting Parties declares
further that it has no commitments towards any other state or
states and shall not undertake any commitments that may cause




The present Treaty is signed for a term of twenty years
and shall be prolonged automatically for every subsequent
period of five years unless one of the High Contracting
Parties declares its intention to terminate its operation
by notifying the other High Contracting Party 12 months
before the expiration of the term of the Treaty.
The Treaty is subject to ratification and shall come
into force on the day the instruments of ratification
are exchanged, which will be effected in Moscow within
one month after the signing of the present Treaty.
Article 12
Any differences in interpreting any article or articles
of the present Treaty that may arise between the High Con
tracting Parties shall be settled on a bilateral basis by
peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and under-
standing.
The above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the
present Treaty in Russian, Hindi and English, all the
texts being equally authentic, and affixed their seals
thereto
.
Done in New Delhi on August 9, 1971.
For the Union of Soviet For the Republic of
Socialist Republics: India:
A. Gromyko , Minister Swaran Singh, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of External Affairs





No. 8194. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE MONGOLIAN
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. SIGNED AT ULAN BATOR, ON
15 JANUARY 1966
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the Presidium of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian
People's Republic,
Reaffirming the loyalty of the Soviet and Mongolian peoples to the purposes
and principles of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the
Union of Soviet Socialist F<.epublics and the Mongolian People's Republic
and the Agreement on economic and cultural co-operation between the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the
Mongolian People's Republic of 27 February 1946,
Expressing the sincere desire of the peoples of both countries to intensify
and strengthen further the Traditional unshakable friendship and the relations
of all-round close co-operation and fraternal mutual assistance between the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People's Republic on the basis
of the principles of socialist internationalism,
Firmly convinced that the development of relations between the two
countries in this manner is in accordance with the vital interests of the Soviet
and Mongolian peoples and with the interests of the socialist community,
Resolved to further in every possible way the preservation and consolidation
of the peace r.nd security of peoples in Asia and throughout the world,
Considering that the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the
Agreement on economic and cultural co-operatio l of 27 February 1946, which
have played un historic role in the steady development of relations of eternal
friendship -~d fraternal co-operation between the two countries, are approaching
the expirv of their terms and arc in need of renewal in the light of the wealth
of experience- gained in the development of political, economic and cultural
relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian




Have decided to conclude this Treaty and for that purpose have appointed
as their plenipotentiaries :
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :
Leonid Ilvich Brezhnev;
The Presidium of the Great People's Khural of the .Mongolian People's Republic :
Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal,
Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form,
have agreed as follows :
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties shall continue to strengthen the unshakable
traditional friendship of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the Mongolian People's Republic and to develop all-round co-operation
and fraternal mutual assistance between the two countries on the basis of the
principles of socialist internationalism.
Article 2
The High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop and intensify
economic, scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries in
accordance with the nrinciples of friendly mutual assistance and mutual benefit
both on a bilateral basis and within the framework of the multilateral co-operation
of the socialist countries, including the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance-
Article 3
The High Contracting Parties shall steadily develop the cultural ties between
the two countries through the further expansion of co-operation in the spheres
of education, health, science, literature, art, the Press, radio and television, and
physical culture and sports.
Article 4
On the basis of and pursuant to this Treaty, separate treaties and agreements
shall be concluded between the Governments and between the appropriate
institutions and organisations of the two Parties.
Article 5
The High Contracting Parties shall assist each other in ensuring the defensive
capacity of the two countries in accordance with the tasks involved in steadily
strengthening the defensive power of the socialist community. The High
Contracting Parties shall consult together on all major international problems




national co-operation, and, acting in the spirit of their finest traditions and of
the Charter of the United Nations, they shall jointly take all necessary measures,
including military measures, with a view to ensuring the security, independence
and territorial integrity of the two countries.
Article 6
The High Contracting Parties shall continue their efforts aimed at the
preservation and strengthening of international peace and the security of peoples,
at the achievement of general and complete disarmament and at the complete
elimination of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. The High
Contracting Parties confirm their readiness to participate, in a spirit of sincere
co-operation, in all international action designed to achieve these lofty aims.
Article 7
The High Contracting Parties shall consistently pursue a policy of main-
taining and itrenitheninz friendly relations and co-operation among States
in Asia and shall act jointly to prevent and remove any threat of imperialist
aggression in that par: of the world.
Article 8
This Tr-aty shall not affect obligations assumed by the Parties under existing
bilateral and mu!tila:eral agreements.
Article 9
This Treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date
of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which shall take place in
Moscow as soon as possible.
Article 10
This Treaty is concluded for a term of twenty years and shall be auto-
matically extended for successive ten-year t;rms if neither of the High
Ccntr=ctir.; Parties sives notice of its desire to terminate it twelve months
before the expiry of the current term.
Done at Ulan Eator on 15 January 1966, in duplicate in the Russian and
Monsolisia languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the Presidium For the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of the Great People's Khural
of Soviet Socialist Republics : of the Mongolian People's Republic :
L. Prezhnev Y. Tsedf.nral
No. jI^





OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
Proceeding from the close cooperation in all fields in a
fraternal spirit, from the unshakable friendship and
solidarity between the two countries on the basis of the
principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism,
Firmly convinced that the endeavour to consolidate the
solidarity and friendship between the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam and the Union or Soviet Socialist Republics is in
conformity with the basic interests of the two peoples and
in the interests of the consolidation of the fraternal
friendship and one-mindedness among the countries in the
socialist community,
In keeping with the principles and objectives of the social-
ist foreign policy and the desire to ensure the most favour-
able international conditions for the building of socialism
and communism,
Confirming that the signatories to the treaty acknowledge
their international obligation to assist each other in the
consolidation and preservation of the socialist achievements
recorded by the two people through their heroic efforts and
selfless labour,
Determined to work for the unity of all forces struggling
for peace, national independence, democracy and social
progress
,
Expressing their iron-like determination to contribute to
the consolidation of peace in Asia and throughout the world,
and to the development of good relations and mutually bene-
ficial cooperation among countries with different social
systems
,
Hoping to further develop and perfect the all-round coopera-
tion between the two countries,
Attaching importance to the continued development and con-
solidation of the juridicial basis of the bilateral relations,
In keeping with the objectives and principles of the United
National Charter,
Have resolved to sign this Treaty of Friendship and Coopera-




In keeping with the principles of socialist internationalism,
the two parties signatory to the present treaty shall continue
to consolidate the unshakable friendship and solidarity and
assist each other in a fraternal spirit. The two parties
shall unceasingly develop political relations and cooperation
in all fields and endeavour to assist each other on the basis
of respect for each other's national independence and sover-
eignty, equality and non-interference in each other's inter-
national affairs.
Article 2
The two parties signatory to the present treaty shall join
efforts to consolidate and broaden the mutually beneficial
cooperation in the economic and scientific- technological
fields in order to push forward the building of socialism
and communism and to constantly raise the material and
cultural standards of the two peoples. The two parties shall
continue to coordinate their long-term national economic
plans, agree upon long-term measures aimed at developing the
most important sectors of the economy, science and technology
and exchange knowledge and experience accumulated in the
building of socialism and communism.
Article 3
The two parties signatory to the treaty shall promote coopera-
tion between their state bodies and mass organizations, and
develop broad relations in the fields of science and culture,
education, literature and art, press, broadcasting and tele-
vision, health service, environmental protection, tourism,
sports and physical training and others. The two parties
shall encourage the development of contacts between the working
people of the two countries.
Article 4
The two parties signatory to the treaty consistently strive
to further consolidate their fraternal relations, and to
strengthen the solidarity and one-mindedness among the social-
ist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist
internationalism.
The two parties shall do their utmost to consolidate the world
socialist system and actively contribute to the development




The two parties signatory to the treaty shall continue doing
their utmost to contribute to defending world peace and the
security of all nations; they shall actively oppose all
schemes and manouvres of imperialism and reactionary forces,
support the just struggle for the complete eradication of
all forms and colours of colonialism and racism, support the
struggle waged by non-aligned countries and the peoples of
Asian, African and Latin American countries against imperialism,
colonialism and neo-colonialism; for the consolidation of
independence and the defence of sovereignty, for mastery over
their natural resources and for the establishment of a new
world economic relationship with no inequality, oppression and
exploitation, and support the aspirations of the Southeast
Asian peoples for peace, independence and cooperation among
countries in this region.
The two parties shall strive to develop the relations between
countries with different social systems on the basis of the
principles of peaceful coexistence, for the purpose of
broadening and consolidating the process of easing tension
in international relations and radically eliminating aggres-
sions and wars of aggression from the life of all nations,
for the sake of peace, national independence, democracy and
socialism.
Article 6
The two parties signatory to the treaty shall exchange views
on all important international questions relating to the
interests of the two countries.
In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack,
the two parties signatory to the treaty shall immediately
consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat,
and shall take appropriate and effective measures to safe-
guard peace and the security of the two countries.
Article 7
The present treaty does not concern the two parties rights
and obligations stemming from the bilateral or multilateral
agreements to which they are signatories and is not intended
to oppose any third country.
Article 8
The present treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into
force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratifi-




The present treaty shall remain in force for 25 years and
thereafter shall automatically extend for periods of ten
years if neither signatory party declares its desire to
terminate the present treaty by informing the other twelve
months before the treaty expires
.
Done in duplicate in the Vietnamese and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic, in Moscow, this third
day of November 1978.
For the Socialist Republic of For the Union of Soviet
Viet Nam: Socialist Republics:
Le Duan L. I. Brezhnev
Phan Van Dong A. N. Kosygin
(Signed) (Signed)
Source: Foreign Broadcast Information Service; USSR,
6 November 1978, pp. L7-L9.
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